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but realize it is possible to improve our performance. To do so, we must
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The 2017 report is divided into six parts:
Waiting for Godot? Virginia Impatiently Anticipates the End of
Sequestration: The Commonwealth’s lackluster economic performance in
2016 highlights a lost decade of slow economic growth. The dependence on
federal spending presents challenges to stimulating growth when discretionary
federal spending is constrained by sequestration. We investigate the reasons
for the slow pace of economic activity and ask whether new efforts to spur
innovation and entrepreneurship are a step in the right direction.
Virginia’s Metros: Running to Stand Still? The Commonwealth’s economy
is the sum of its regional parts, however different they may be. After most
regions performed poorly in 2016, there are signs that 2017 may be a more
positive year. We delve into data on employment, jobs and taxable sales to ask

phenomenal growth, and ask how Airbnb plays a role in the larger “gig
economy.”
Affordability and Access in Virginia Public Higher Education: The typical
public four-year university has increased its published tuition and fees two to
four times as rapidly as the consumer price index. Have reductions in state
appropriations driven these increases or are they a result of administrative
proliferation, new amenities and the lack of firm control on tuition and fees by
the Commonwealth? We estimate the costs and consequences.
Time to Go Regional or Mega? Interest in regional cooperation is rising
again in the Commonwealth. We discuss the benefits of regionalism and
examine the rise of megaregions in the United States. We ask whether there is
a Richmond-Hampton Roads megaregion in the making.

whether the good news will last.
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WAITING FOR GODOT?
VIRGINIA IMPATIENTLY
ANTICIPATES THE END
OF SEQUESTRATION
Budget sequestration is a procedure in
United States law that limits the size of the
federal budget.
– Wikipedia, in a classic understatement
insofar as Virginia is concerned
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■

A

decade after the Great Recession,
economic growth in the
Commonwealth remains tepid. For

six consecutive years, the real (after inflation)
economic growth of Virginia’s economy trailed
that of the United States. In two of these years,
our state’s economic growth was negative,
meaning the Virginia economy contracted.
There has been real economic growth in 2017,
but it once again will be less than that of the
nation.
The reasons for this underperformance are
numerous: a dependence on federal spending,
lackluster job creation among small and
medium-sized enterprises, less than optimal
development strategies and constraints on local
governments. At the same time, Virginia has
become an expensive place to pursue a public
higher education degree, must deal with an
opioid crisis and is burdened by several regions
whose traditional economic bases have eroded
substantially.
Some disagreement exists on the condition
of Virginia’s economy. Is our economic glass
half full or half empty? No one believes we are
amid an economic boom, but some point with
enthusiasm to the Commonwealth’s job growth,
competitive business environment, thriving
port and attractive location as harbingers of
a much brighter future. To others, however,
Virginia is a state exhibiting mediocre or
worse economic performance; suffering
from unnecessarily burdensome taxes and
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regulations; and experiencing an outmigration of younger workers.1 Both

Let’s examine Graph 1. The Commonwealth’s real GDP growth in 2016

views contain kernels of truth. Reconciling these discordant views is a

was only 0.6 percent, well below the somewhat weak performance of the

task we undertake in this chapter.

entire United States economy at 1.6 percent. There are, however, glimmers

The economic data reveal a mixture of good and bad news. Economic
growth decelerated in 2016, but picked up in 2017. Virginia’s
unemployment rate has fallen, its labor force has expanded and
earnings have risen. On the other hand, our labor force participation
rate remains low when compared to prior to the Great Recession
– increasing numbers of people no longer are actively seeking

of good news in these numbers. Economic activity picked up in the second
half of 2016 and Virginia now has had three consecutive quarters with
growth at or above 1.5 percent. The national economy is accelerating,
with 3.1 and 3 percent growth in the second and third quarters of 2017,
respectively.2 The question is whether Virginia will pick up the pace or
continue to fall behind.

employment. Job creation by small and medium-sized firms has fallen,

Our estimate for economic growth for 2017 is 1.8 percent, which would

raising questions about Virginia’s efforts to encourage and sustain new

represent an increase in economic activity from 2016. However, we

businesses.

will grow more slowly than our historical average and more slowly

Making sense of conf licting economic news is difficult. It is much
easier to cherry-pick one statistic to trumpet on Twitter, cable TV or
the internet. However, this would provide a deceptive view of what is a

than the United States. If our forecasts are reasonably accurate,
however, then this would represent the first consecutive years of real
GDP growth above 1 percent for Virginia since 2005-2006.

much more complicated economic situation. The task of this chapter is to

What is behind Virginia’s lethargic economic performance? An obvious

make sense of this jumble of seemingly contradictory data.

culprit is the recent stagnation in federal government spending in Virginia.
The federal government accounts for almost 30 percent of state GDP3 and

Disappointing
Economic Growth Rates
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the headline measure of economic

therefore constant or declining federal spending is problematic. In fiscal
year 2015 (FY 2015), Virginia was first among states in annual federal
spending per capita ($17,502), annual per capita spending on federal
contracts ($5,819) and annual per capita defense spending ($6,324).
Virginia was also one of three states with annual total federal salaries and
wages above $20 billion, the other two being Texas and California.4

performance in the United States and the Commonwealth. It places a
dollar amount on the value of all the goods and services we produce.
While no measure of economic activity is perfect, and GDP does not
count nonmarket activities such as barter, misses portions of the “gig
economy” and does not place a value on household production, it is the
most commonly used benchmark of the value of overall economic activity.
In order not to be deceived by price inflation, however, we focus on real
(price-adjusted) GDP.
1 G
 regory S. Schneider, “In their final debate for Va. Governor, Northam and Gillespie spar over records,
economy, taxes.” The Washington Post (Oct. 10, 2017).

4

2 Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Gross Domestic Product: Third
Quarter 2017 (advance estimate).
3 The Council on State Governments (2017). “Federal Spending in the States” http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/
kc/system/files/2017_CFFR_Report_3.pdf.
4 Office of Economic Adjustment (2017). “Defense Spending by State: Fiscal Year 2015”
www.oea.gov/resource/defense-spending-state-fiscal-year-2015.
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GRAPH 1
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA ACTUAL AND FORECASTED REAL GDP, 2010-2018 Q2
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Graph 2 shows the decline in the total dollar volume of federal contracts
and Department of Defense (DOD) contracts in Virginia between FY
2008 and FY 2016. Total federal contracts in Virginia fell 7.8 percent over
this period, from $54.8 billion in FY 2008 to $50.6 billion in FY 2016.5
The total dollar volume of DOD contracts was down 21.1 percent over the
same period. Not only have contract awards fallen, but also the number of
active-duty military personnel in Virginia declined by 25.5 percent over a
similar period – from 119,950 in September 2008 to 89,333 in June 2017.6
At the same time DOD contract spending was stagnating, total federal
awards declined in Virginia.7 As illustrated in Graph 3, total federal
awards for all purposes peaked in FY 2012 and declined from FY 2013
through FY 2015. That Virginia’s economy remained in neutral during
most of these years should be no surprise.

Navy.mil

5 USAspending.gov (2017). State Summary: Virginia.
6 Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/County, 2017,
www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.
7 Total awards include contracts, other financial assistance, grants and loans.
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GRAPH 2
FEDERAL CONTRACTS IN VIRGINIA, FY 2008 TO FY 2017

GRAPH 2

Federal Contracts In Virginia, FY 2008 To FY 2017
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GRAPH 3
TOTAL FEDERAL, DOD AND NON-DOD AWARDS IN VIRGINIA, FY 2008 TO FY 2016

GRAPH 3
Total Federal, DOD and Non-DOD Awards In Virginia, FY 2008 To FY 2016
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Total DoD Awards

2013

2014

Non-DoD Awards

2015

2016

Changes In Output:
Running In Place

TABLE 1
REAL GDP GROWTH RANK
Virginia

Top State

Bottom State

2010

12

North Dakota
(7.2%)

Alaska
(-1.7%)

2011

35

North Dakota
(7.8%)

Louisiana
(-2.6%)

2012

31

North Dakota
(22.2%)

Wyoming
(-3.5%)

2013

40

Texas
(5.1%)

Alaska
(-4.4%)

2014

48

North Dakota
(7.3%)

Alaska
(-3.3%)

2015

19

Texas
(4.5%)

North Dakota
(-3.1%)

2016

41

Washington
(3.7%)

North Dakota
(-6.5%)

2017 (Q1)

8

Texas
(3.9%)

Nebraska
(-4.0%)

Before the Great Recession, which began in December 2007 and
ended in June 2009, Virginia consistently ranked in the top half of
states in terms of real GDP growth. Since the recession, Virginia has
fallen behind its peers. With one exception (2015), Virginia’s economic
performance has been in the bottom half of states since 2011.
Table 1 ranks Virginia’s real GDP growth against other states. The
rankings do not give much reason to brag. Two states stand out as
boom or bust: Alaska and North Dakota. When energy prices rise, the
economies of these states grow rapidly, but falling energy prices generate
the opposite effect.
Why is this important for Virginia? Federal spending in the
Commonwealth is akin to oil and natural gas for Alaska and North
Dakota. In the first decade of the century, rapid increases in defense
spending fueled economic growth in Virginia. In the second decade,
declines in federal awards and active-duty DOD personnel have shifted the
Commonwealth’s economic engine to neutral.
Not all the news is bad. Real economic growth in the first quarter of 2017
was 2 percent,8 above that of the United States and catapulting Virginia

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product by State: First Quarter of 2017

into the Top 10 of states in economic growth. Whether we can sustain this
rate of economic growth depends, in part, on whether proposed increases
in defense spending materialize in late 2017 and into 2018.

8 2nd Quarter real GDP data for Virginia is scheduled to be released on Nov. 21, 2017.
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Defense Spending And
Sequestration: A Closer Look

Comparing the differences between the defense authorization and

Using the word “sequestration” is almost equivalent to cursing in public

FY 2018 budget was $603 billion, $54 billion above the cap established

for many Virginians. Sequestration historically referred to the forcible

by the BCA. The House’s version of the National Defense Authorization

removable of assets until a debt was paid. In 2011, with the passage of the

Act proposed national defense spending of $624 billion, while the Senate

Budget Control Act (BCA), sequestration described a specific requirement

proposed spending at $640 billion. The conference agreement set the base

for the president to reduce appropriated expenditures to the limits set by

national defense spending at $626.4 billion, clearly above the existing BCA

the BCA. While sequestration occurred only once in FY 2013, the term is

caps.10

now used to describe the BCA’s caps on national defense and nondefense
discretionary spending. Under current law, these caps extend to FY 2025.

appropriations bills sheds light on the challenges facing Congress. The
BCA cap for FY 2018 on national defense discretionary budget authority
is $549 billion.9 The president’s budget request for national defense in the

Turning to the appropriations process for the DOD, the president’s base
budget request for FY 2018 was $574 billion, exceeding the DOD’s BCA’s

Attempting to forecast the outcome of the budget process in the current

caps by $52 billion. The House passed an appropriations bill in July

political climate is fraught with pitfalls, but we can make some useful

2017, setting the DOD’s base budget at $584 billion. While the Senate

observations. Congress must not only reconcile competing defense

had yet to move a DOD appropriations bill out of subcommittee by the

authorization bills, but must also come to an agreement on defense

time this report was distributed, in all likelihood, the Senate’s defense

appropriations bills.

appropriations bill will also be in excess of the BCA caps.

Congress also is attempting to pass tax cuts, extend the debt ceiling,

Although members of the House and Senate publicly acknowledge that

reauthorize the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), decide

the defense spending proposals exceed the BCA caps, no action has yet

whether to act on Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and,

been taken to amend or repeal the spending caps. This means that even if

most recently, discuss the Iranian nuclear deal. The legislative calendar is,

Congress were to agree to higher levels of FY 2018 defense spending, the

to put it mildly, full.

president would be required to implement a sequester to lower spending to
the FY 2018 caps.

Authorization bills create, extend or modify laws and set the amount

would be required under the BCA to order the DOD to implement

of money that appropriators may spend on a specific program.

an across-the-board 13 percent sequester, twice the amount of the

Appropriations bills provide discretionary funding to agencies and

FY 2013 sequester. To say that such a sequester would significantly

programs that have been authorized. While an authorization bill may
create or extend a new program (building a new aircraft carrier, for
example), the program is not funded by Congress until an appropriations
bill containing the funding is signed into law. Federal agencies may only
spend what is appropriated by Congress.

10

Using the House appropriations bill as a reference point, the president

harm the DOD’s operations is an understatement. Another round of
sequestration would likely throw Virginia’s economy into reverse.
Given the legislative hurdles to pass the defense authorization and
appropriations bills, there is a good chance that Congress will pass a
9 The National Defense budget function (050) consists of the DOD military (subfunction 051), defense-related
programs in the Department of Energy (subfunction 053) and Department of Justice (subfunction 054). DOD
activities have typically been 95 percent of the national defense budget request.
10 https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/senate-and-house-armed-services-committeescomplete-conference-on-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2018.
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new continuing resolution (CR) when the current CR expires on Dec.
8, 2017. A CR is legislation in the form of a joint resolution passed by
Congress to provide budget authority to federal agencies and programs
to continue in operation until regulation appropriations acts are passed
by Congress and signed into law. Continuing resolutions typically provide
existing agencies and programs with budget authority based on the
previous year’s appropriations.
Continuing resolutions usually prohibit expansion of existing programs
and most new program starts. These resolutions typically constrain the

•

ability of federal managers to address a changing environment and new
demands for goods and services.
The impact of a CR on the DOD is not trivial. Over the last decade, the

JSSWASHINGTON.SSN

DOD has entered all but one fiscal year under a CR. The most recent
delay, for example, between the start of FY 2017 and the passage of a

'

FEARTHEBLACKFISH
'

787

PREPARED FOR WAR

defense appropriations bill was 217 days (Graph 4), a delay exceeded only
once since 1970.
With an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment and increasing
demands on the military services, CRs constrain DOD flexibility and
planning. CRs also result in the delay of maintenance programs (including
ship repair) and reductions in training and readiness. Former DOD

Navy.mil

Comptroller David Norquist eloquently captured the impact of a CR
on DOD, “The longer the CR lasts, the more damage they do. They are
corrosive.”11
The good news for Virginia is that we expect defense spending will
increase in 2018. While there is not much agreement in Congress, there
appears to be an emerging consensus that the BCA caps should be
modified (or eliminated entirely). With a modification of the BCA caps and
passage of the authorization and appropriations bills, defense expenditures
in Virginia would increase in the second half of 2018. Such increases would
be welcome news and would spur increased economic growth, subject to
the usual caveats on economic and political shocks.

11 h
 ttps://federalnewsradio.com/defense-main/2017/09/cr-for-defense-likely-until-december-but-with-a-fewanomalies/.
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GRAPH 4

GRAPH 4

LENGTH OF CONTINUING RESOLUTION FOR DOD APPROPRIATIONS

Length of Continuing Resolution for DOD Appropriations
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Sectoral Growth In Virginia

that this sector will continue its decline relative to other parts of the
economy.

Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis suggest that the
manufacturing sector contracted by 5.6 percent from 2015 to 2016. Graph
5 provides the annual growth rate for manufacturing as well as the other
major sectors of the economy.
2016 represented the sixth consecutive year of decline for the
manufacturing industry. As a share of overall economy activity in Virginia,
the manufacturing sector declined from 11.6 percent at the beginning of
the century to only 8.2 percent in 2016.
Potentially troubling is the contraction in economic activity in the
management of companies. Wages and salaries in this sector are typically
higher than other sectors and any contraction would signal a loss of highpaying jobs. In 2015, the sector grew almost 4 percent, so it is possible that
2016 is an anomaly.
On a more positive note, the agricultural sector grew by almost 6.4
percent in 2016. Utilities, information and health care, transportation and
warehousing, and professional and business services also grew in 2016.
How has the economy of Virginia changed over time? In Graph 6, we
compare the shares of real GDP in 2007 and 2016 for each major industry
in the Commonwealth. Not only does this capture the relative contribution
of each sector to overall economic activity, but also the changing
contributions of each sector. Strong growth in professional and business
services, health care and social assistance, and finance and insurance
illustrate the increasing importance of these sectors to Virginia. More
traditional sectors, to include manufacturing and wholesale trade, declined
in importance
What about agriculture and mining? These sectors have steadily declined
in relative importance over time, now each accounting for about 0.3
percent of economic activity in Virginia. The mining sector continues to
struggle with a 0.9 percent decline in 2016 on the heels of a 12.8 percent
contraction in 2015. While mining once offered a source of good-paying
jobs and contributed positively to economic growth in Virginia, it appears

13
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GRAPH 5

GRAPH 5

VIRGINIA: 2015-2016 GROWTH IN SELECTED INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
Contributions To Virginia 2016 Real GDP Growth
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GRAPH
6 GDP, 2007 AND 2016
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Labor Market Conditions
Labor market conditions generally continued to improve in 2016. Nearly
4.4 million Virginians were in the labor force in September 2017, an
increase of around 85,000 from the year previous (Graph 7). Not only
were more Virginians employed or actively looking for work, but also the
number of employed workers increased in 2017. July 2017 represented
the largest labor force and the largest number of employed Virginians on
record since data collection began in 1976.

The data in Graphs 7 and 8 come from the Current Population Survey,
which surveys households to find out if they are working, actively seeking
work or not in the labor force. The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the
survey for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
More Virginians at work drove the Commonwealth’s unemployment rate
to lows not seen since April 2008. Graph 8 displays the unemployment
rates in Virginia and the United States and shows that the unemployment
rate in the Commonwealth typically has been below that of the United
States. In September 2017, the unemployment rate in Virginia was 3.7
percent, compared to 4.2 percent for the United States.
However, there is some cause for concern. Traditionally, Virginia’s
unemployment rate has been about 1.5 percent below that of the nation.
This 1.5 percent gap continued all through the 2002-2008 expansion and
even grew during the Great Recession. However, since 2012, Virginia’s
unemployment rate only has been about 0.7 percent lower than the
national rate.
Could this signal a new economic reality for Virginia? Perhaps. The era of
hyper-partisan politics and federal budget uncertainty could mean that a
more “natural” rate of unemployment for the state is around 3.5 percent
instead of 3 percent. In that case, the Virginia economy may be close to
full employment.

16
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GRAPH 7

GRAPH 7

SIZE OF THE LABOR FORCE IN VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2005 TO SEPTEMBER 2017

Size Of The Labor Force In Virginia, January 2005 To September 2017
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GRAPH 8

GRAPH 8

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 2007 TO SEPTEMBER 2017

Unemployment Rates For Virginia and the United States, January 2007 To September 2017
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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Virginia Employment Commission (seasonally adjusted data)

18

8

■ WAITING FOR GODOT? VIRGINIA IMPATIENTLY ANTICIPATES THE END OF SEQUESTRATION

Labor Force Participation

Virginia and above 70 percent in Northern Virginia, Richmond and much
of Hampton Roads. A challenge for Virginia is to address the declines in
manufacturing, mining and other traditional employment sectors that

Whether Virginians choose to participate in the labor force influences

influence participation rates. A further challenge, discussed later in this

the level of employment, unemployment and the overall size of the labor
force. Virginia’s labor force participation rate typically exceeds that of the
United States and 2017 is no exception. Almost 66 percent of Virginians
participated in the labor force in September 2017 versus about 63 percent
of all Americans.12

report, is how the opioid crisis undermines labor force participation.
Here is where the rubber meets the road with regard to labor force
participation rates. One way or another, society must support individuals
of prime working age who for whatever reasons are not in the labor

Labor force participation varies by locality. Figure 1 shows participation
rates for 2016 were below 50 percent in many counties in southwestern

force. Falling labor force participation therefore constitutes an anchor
that drags down economic growth. Hence, one way to stimulate economic
growth in Virginia is to increase labor force participation rates.

12 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, October 2017.

FIGURE 1
VIRGINIA LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY LOCALITY, 2016

Percent

-

Less than 50 percent
50 - 55
56-65
66 - 72

-

73 - 88

Source: Virginia Employment Commission, Economic Information & Analytics, September 2017
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Virginia’s Job Performance:
Better But Not Great

Virginia’s share of total employment in manufacturing has declined

How has Virginia performed in terms of jobs? Total nonfarm payroll

in South Carolina, 11 percent in North Carolina, 10 percent in

employment expanded by 58,500 jobs in 2016, a 1.5 percent increase from
2015 (Graph 9). This was the second-highest year for job creation since
the Great Recession and is a welcome sign after our mediocre growth in
2013 and 2014. Job growth in the Commonwealth, however, continues to

every year since 1990. Compared to many neighboring states, Virginia
has the lowest share of employment in manufacturing. Only 6 percent
of Virginia’s jobs are in manufacturing, compared to 12 percent
Pennsylvania and 9 percent in Georgia. While Virginia has a higher
share of manufacturing jobs than Maryland, Delaware, New York and
New Jersey, this may not be a peg on which the Commonwealth wants
to hang its hat.

lag the United States.

The data in Graphs 9 and 10 come from the Current Employment
Statistics program, which is a monthly survey of establishments on
employment, hours and earnings. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
conducts the survey.

Digging into the monthly job numbers, Virginia’s year-over-year total
nonfarm employment growth rate exceeded that of the United States in
2015 (Graph 10), but decelerated in the second half of 2016 and the first
half of 2017. While job creation in the Commonwealth exceeded that of
the United States in July and August of 2017, year-over-year growth was
anemic in September 2017 at 0.9 percent. Virginia is underperforming the
United States in job creation.
Graph 11 examines sector-level employment growth from 2015 to 2016.
The health care and social assistance and leisure and hospitality industries
led job creation in 2016, each adding 13,700 jobs when compared to 2015.
Professional and business services also generated a significant number of
new jobs (12,900), while the government sector added around 3,000 jobs.
The information, mining and manufacturing sectors lost jobs in 2016.
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GRAPH 9
TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT AND ANNUAL GROWTH RATE, 2007-2016

Graph 9
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GRAPH 10
YEAR-OVER-YEAR GROWTH
IN JOBS:
10 VIRGINIA AND UNITED STATES
Graph

Year-Over-Year Growth in Jobs: Virginia and United States
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GRAPH 11
VIRGINIA: CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT LEVELS BY SELECTED SECTORS, 2015-2016

GRAPH 11

Virginia: Change In Employment Levels By Sector, 2015-2016
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Average Weekly Earnings
Given that more Virginians are in the labor force and are employed, are
they earning more money?13 The good news is that a Virginian’s average
weekly earnings grew by 3.4 percent in 2016, well above the 2.6 percent
growth for the United States (Graph 12). Virginia’s earnings growth,
however, appears to have fallen behind the United States in 2017 and
may end up being below 2 percent.
The latest average weekly earnings data for August 2017 show that

when compared to August 2016. While this is still behind earnings growth
in the United States, where earnings increased by 2.5 percent in the
same period, it is higher than earlier in the year. We expect that earnings
growth will pick up in 2018 if Virginia’s economy continues its recent
expansionary pattern.
The economic data are discordant. Output gains are anemic and lag the
United States. More Virginians are in the labor force, gainfully employed
and enjoying larger paychecks. However, when Virginia is compared to
neighboring states and the nation, its economic performance is mediocre.

Virginia’s year-on-year average earnings growth increased by 1.9 percent

13 W
 e use average hourly earnings from the Current Employment Statistics program. This series measures
wages and not total compensation. Benefits, bonuses and payroll taxes paid by employers are not included.
As a result, average hourly earnings is not a suitable indicator of labor costs to firms.
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GRAPH 12

GRAPHHOURLY
12
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES: GROWTH IN AVERAGE
EARNINGS, FEBRUARY 2012 TO AUGUST 2017
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The Dynamics Of
Establishments In Virginia
An interesting alternative way to view the lack of dynamism in the
Virginia economy is to focus on the number of new business establishments
that have been created. New business creation reflects both economic
optimism and perceived opportunities.14 It is apparent that Virginia has
been falling short here recently. Let’s see what the data tell us.
An overwhelming number of the employed (approximately 90 percent)15
in the United States are employed by businesses (as opposed to being selfemployed). Graph 13 displays the share of jobs for small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), which accounted for 48 percent of jobs in Virginia
and almost 50 percent of jobs in the United States.16 Virginia has tended to
rely more on larger enterprises than the rest of the country, but this gap
has closed dramatically since the Great Recession as the share of jobs in
SMEs in the U.S. has declined below 50 percent. In other words, the share
of total employment of large firms is growing in the United States and
approaching that of Virginia.
Graph 14 displays SME’s share of job creation in Virginia and the
United States.17 For most of this century, Virginia’s job creation by
SMEs has trailed the United States. Brief ly, in the fourth quarter of
2015 and the first quarter of 2016, the share of job creation by SMEs
in Virginia exceeded the national average, but retreated in the latest
data available.

14 T
 here are subtle but important differences between establishments, firms and enterprises. An
establishment is a single physical location while a firm is an establishment or a combination of
establishments. Most businesses in the United States are single-establishment firms and the use of
establishment data provides more precision with regard to employment. For further discussion see: www.
bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/establishment-firm-or-enterprise.htm.
15 “Self-Employment in the United States,” Steven Hipple and Laurel Hammond, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
March 2016.
16 Small and medium-sized enterprises have 499 employees or fewer.
17 We examine gross job creation, which is different from net job creation. Net job creation is the difference
between jobs being created (firm births and expansions) and jobs being destroyed (firm declines or firm
deaths).
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GRAPH 13

GraphVIRGINIA
13
SHARE OF JOBS FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES:
AND THE UNITED STATES, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q2
4-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE
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54.0%
SME Share VA

SME Share US

53.0%
52.0%
51.0%

49.8%

50.0%
49.0%

48.0%

48.0%
47.0%
46.0%
45.0%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics

14

27

2017 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT

GRAPH 14

GRAPH BY
14 SMES, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q2:
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Small Establishment
Creation

As shown in Graph 17, net establishment creation was close to zero

Not surprisingly, businesses start and fail on a regular basis. About 80

Not surprisingly, the Commonwealth posted its best postrecession real

percent of establishments in the United States with employees survive

GDP growth in 2015 when Virginians created, on average, 2,000 net new

their first year of business, 66 percent survive a second year and 50

establishments. Since the turn of the century, the Commonwealth’s real

percent survive until their fifth year of business. About 30 percent of

GDP growth was lackluster in years when net births were negative and

establishments survive until their 10th year of business. Improving

robust in years when net births were above the historical average.

or negative in 2013 (likely due to sequestration) and uneven in 2014.
2015 was a robust year for establishment births in the first and third
quarters, and the first quarter of 2016 saw more births than deaths.

18

establishment creation and survival is a key to generating long-term
economic development.
How is Virginia faring in fostering a climate conducive to establishment
creation? Graph 15 displays the number of new establishments in
Virginia from the first quarter of 2000 through the last quarter of 2016.
On average, about 5,600 new establishments are created each quarter

New establishments create jobs, while establishment deaths destroy
jobs. Graph 18 illustrates the net job gain or loss from the creation
and destruction of establishments. We can again see that when net job
creation falls, economic activity in the Commonwealth stagnates. The
relatively good performance of the Commonwealth in 2015 was, in
part, driven by a large uptick in new establishment job creation.

in Virginia. The pace of new establishment births declined in the
aftermath of the Great Recession and once again in 2013 in response to
sequestration. Births peaked in 2015 and remained above the historical
average for most of 2016. The four-quarter moving average is also trending
back to the historical average, suggesting slowing establishment births. If
the focus of public policy has been on fostering new establishments, then it
appears that Virginia has been only modestly successful in this regard.
What about establishment destruction? Graph 16 presents establishment
deaths in Virginia for 2000 to 2016 Q1. On average, 5,054 establishments
died per quarter over the period. As one might expect, firm deaths during
the Great Recession spiked and there also was an increase in deaths in
the third quarter of 2013, perhaps due to sequestration. Firm deaths rose
above the long-term average in the first quarter of 2016, in line with our
previous discussion that 2016 was a poor year for economic activity in the
Commonwealth.
If the objective of economic development is to foster an environment
conducive to the creation and sustainment of new establishments, then
Virginia’s postrecession performance is underwhelming in most years.
18 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Survival of private sector establishments by opening year,” www.bls.gov/bdm/
us_age_naics_00_table7.txt.
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GRAPH 15
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENT BIRTHS, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q4

GRAPH 15

Number Of Establishment Births, 2000 Q1 To 2016 Q4
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GRAPH 16
ESTABLISHMENT DEATHS IN
VIRGINIA,
GRAPH
16 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q1
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GRAPH 17
NET ESTABLISHMENT BIRTHS IN VIRGINIA, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q1

Graph 17
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GRAPH 18
NET JOB CREATION IN VIRGINIA BY NET ESTABLISHMENT BIRTHS, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q1

GRAPH 18 Net Job Creation In Virginia By Net Establishment Births, 2000 Q1 To 2016 Q1
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Small And Young Firms
And Job Creation

States is highly cyclical, increasing during periods of economic expansion

We now move to examining whether small firms and young firms

created net jobs at a higher rate than Virginia. Simply put, Virginia

contribute to job creation in the Commonwealth. We would like the reader
to note that our conversation is shifting from establishments to firms as
we are beholden to the available data. While the two are invariably linked
(many establishments are single-unit firms), there are fewer firms than
establishments. Young firms are the ones responsible for the lion’s share of
job creation.19 Let’s take one more dive into the numbers.

and declining during periods of slow growth or contraction. Since the
Great Recession, however, the paths of the United States and Virginia
have diverged. Since 2012, younger firms in the United States have
is falling behind in the creation of new jobs by young firms. The
sluggishness of the Virginia economy may be due, in part, to the lack of
dynamism in small firm creation.
Is Virginia succeeding at fostering an improved climate for startups? The
data suggest that the Commonwealth is creating an environment where
individuals are creating more new firms than at any previous point in the
century. Yet, the focus on firm creation may be misleading. The death rate

An establishment is a firm operating in a single physical location. A firm

of young firms in Virginia is too high and thus net job creation for smaller

may have more than one establishment. A local “mom and pop” store

and younger firms in Virginia lags that of the nation.

with only one location is a single-establishment firm. A firm with multiple

We urge public officials and economic development agencies to focus

locations is a multi-establishment firm.

on the sustainability of small and young firms. It is not enough to
proclaim the number of startups as a measure of success. Reducing the

Undoubtedly, net job creation by small firms and net job creation by young
firms are linked. Younger firms tend to be small, but there are also many
small firms that are “long in the tooth.” Firm size is a function of efficient
scale, so equating startups with all small firms can be misleading.

mortality rate of these firms is important to retain the newly created
jobs and create economic growth in the Commonwealth. Redirecting
scarce public funds from grandiose development efforts to services that
sustain small firms is a step in the right direction.

It is interesting to examine net job data by firm age rather than firm
size. We classify young firms as those in existence for 0 to 10 years and
mature firms as those 11-plus years in existence. Graph 19 shows that net
job creation is highly cyclical in mature firms, much more so than young
firms. In fact, mature firms generate far more net jobs during periods
of economic expansion. However, young firm net job growth is far more
stable across the business cycle. Mature firms generated more net jobs in
the early stages of recovery from the Great Recession, but the pace of job
creation by younger firms now exceeds that of more established firms.
How does our pace of young firm job creation compare to the nation?
Graph 20 shows that net job creation in both Virginia and the United
19 Haltiwanger, et al. “Who Creates Jobs? Small versus Large versus Young,” The Review of Economics and
Statistics, May 2013.
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GRAPH 19

GRAPH 19

YOUNG FIRM NET JOB CREATION IN VIRGINIA, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q3:
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GRAPH 20

GRAPH
20 AND THE UNITED STATES,
YOUNG FIRM NET JOB CREATION
IN VIRGINIA
2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q2: 4-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE
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Looking Ahead
In the next year or two, the only undisputed way to supercharge
the Virginia economy is for the federal government to end budget
sequestration. Federal spending continues to be the most important
determinant of the Commonwealth’s economic destiny.
In the long run, however, Virginia does control most of its own economic
fate. We can make intelligent, focused decisions that improve the business
climate in the Commonwealth. Improved economic infrastructure, an
enhanced K-12 education system and targeted investments in “ed-med”
research and development are among the most attractive strategies
available to us.
However, as we have just seen, providing the environment and resources
that will encourage the creation of a larger number of new firms also
deserves increased attention and support, as do efforts toward helping
these budding firms survive. Alas, this would constitute a new way of
looking at things for most cities and counties, which have tended to
focus their economic development dollars on financial grants to selected
private entrepreneurs who construct showpiece hotels, arenas and other
visible structures that elected officials proudly point to as immediate
achievements. This is despite abundant empirical evidence that the
economic rate of return on such public investments often is impressively
low, or even negative.
Supporting new entrants into the marketplace represents a much less
expensive and likely more productive use of public funds. While this is a
long-run approach to economic development, it is more likely to lead to
economic diversification.
The same can be said of investments in infrastructure, K-12 education
and “ed-med” activities. They constitute long-term strategies. Witness
California, North Carolina and Texas in this regard. Each of these states
now is enjoying impressive growth based substantially upon investments
made decades previously.
Do Virginia and its cities and counties have the vision and patience to
pursue this path? We shall see.
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VIRGINIA’S METROS:
RUNNING TO
STAND STILL?
We can do lots better, but we’re going to have
to get used to doing it together.
– A Virginia legislator
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T

he Virginia economy we see is the
product of the economic activities
of citizens and businesses across the

Commonwealth. However, each metropolitan
area is distinctive and therefore does not
always perform in sync with Virginia as
a whole. Nevertheless, from an economic
standpoint, the state is the sum of its regional
parts, however different from each other they
may be. Hence, understanding the economic
performance of specific metropolitan areas can
provide us with insight into the challenge of
generating consistent, broad-based economic
growth across the entire Commonwealth.
Unfortunately, measuring economic vitality at
the metropolitan area level (MSA) often can be
a perplexing task. As we have noted in previous
State of the Commonwealth reports, the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) generates
the national, state and MSA gross domestic
product (GDP) estimates that we and nearly all
other analysts use. A problem is that the BEA’s
GDP estimates for states and regions have long
lag times. Even though we are nearly through
2017, the BEA’s current advance estimates for
MSAs only include economic activity through
2016.
This is not the only challenge. The BEA’s MSA
estimates are updated annually and often those
updates produce significantly revised, almost
head-scratching estimates. For Virginia’s
MSAs, these revisions can change economic
growth from negative to positive. This is one
of the reasons why we caution Virginians from
drawing conclusions based on BEA data alone.
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BEA estimates provide us with only one glimpse of an economic picture

Virginia grew only 0.6 percent in 2016, so the poor regional numbers are

that may be much more complicated. These estimates should be used only

not entirely surprising.

as one piece of information.

Unfortunately, even if we do take a perspective longer than a single year,

With these caveats in mind, Table 1 presents real (inflation-adjusted)

things do not improve. While the United States’ real GDP growth rate

GDP growth rates for Virginia’s metropolitan areas between 2010 and

between 2010 and 2016 was 2.1 percent, only Richmond approached the

2016. In 2016, Virginia continued to struggle to produce economic

national average. Three regions – Harrisonburg, Lynchburg and Staunton

growth across all its metropolitan regions. The Commonwealth’s

– contracted over the period and real GDP growth was anemic in the

largest economic region, Northern Virginia, grew at a tepid pace. Only

remaining metro areas. Another startling fact is that Richmond was the

one region, Richmond, stood out in terms of economic performance.

only metro area in Virginia to post positive GDP growth annually since

Blacksburg, Harrisonburg, Hampton Roads, Staunton and Winchester

2010.

each recorded significant contractions in 2016. Charlottesville,

1

Lynchburg and Roanoke contracted as well, though only moderately.

TABLE 1
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GROWTH RATES, 2010-2016
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2010-2016
CAGR1

United States

2.5%

1.6%

2.2%

1.7%

2.6%

2.9%

1.5%

2.1%

Virginia

2.4%

0.7%

0.6%

0.0%

0.1%

2.4%

0.6%

0.7%

Blacksburg

1.2%

1.4%

7.6%

-1.0%

2.2%

2.8%

-2.1%

1.8%

Charlottesville

3.3%

1.0%

2.7%

-0.5%

3.8%

4.5%

-0.7%

1.8%

Hampton Roads

-1.6%

0.3%

-0.8%

-0.6%

-0.3%

2.8%

-1.1%

0.0%

Harrisonburg

3.6%

-0.9%

-0.9%

-0.4%

-0.3%

2.5%

-2.2%

-0.4%

Lynchburg

2.5%

-1.8%

-0.9%

0.0%

-0.2%

-0.3%

-0.5%

-0.6%

Northern
Virginia

3.8%

1.5%

0.5%

-0.8%

0.5%

2.4%

1.1%

1.2%

Richmond

1.7%

0.8%

2.8%

1.3%

1.0%

3.7%

2.6%

2.0%

Roanoke

-1.5%

-1.0%

0.4%

-0.1%

-0.2%

2.3%

-0.4%

0.1%

Staunton

3.0%

-6.8%

-7.6%

1.7%

0.8%

3.0%

-2.1%

-1.9%

Winchester

3.0%

1.9%

1.4%

1.4%

1.0%

2.9%

-1.6%

1.2%

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Center for Economic Analysis and Policy

1 T
 he Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) is a measure of growth over multiple periods.
While annual averages ignore the effects of compounding and can overestimate growth,
CAGR captures the one consistent rate at which real GDP would have grown over time.
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Making sense of the MSA-level GDP data can be akin to taking a

individual is working for them. The jobs data can thus significantly

Rorschach test. The picture may be blurry and different individuals

outpace the employment data if people are working multiple jobs.3 Both

will draw very different conclusions. Because this is true, we introduce

measures provide valuable information about the state of the economy.

three additional measures to help us analyze the performance of each

Thus, while the terms “jobs” and “employment” might mean the same

metropolitan area: (1) employment, (2) wages and (3) taxable sales. A

thing to a noneconomist, to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (and therefore

major advantage of these additional variables is that each is measured

to economists) they have different meanings. They are measured in

more frequently. Employment and taxable sales are measured monthly,

different ways and thus yield different information.

while wages are measured quarterly. Hence, they provide a better “realtime” picture of the economic conditions in a metro area. Also, one can
argue that these three measures are more tightly linked to metro area
economic health than GDP.

Are more people employed in Virginia’s metropolitan areas? Graph 1
shows that employment growth was higher in each of the Commonwealth’s
metro areas between January and August 2017 when compared to 2016.
This is good news, as more people are reporting that they are gainfully
employed compared to the previous year.

Metropolitan Area
Employment

In Virginia’s three largest metropolitan areas, employment growth was
highest in Northern Virginia, followed by Richmond and then Hampton
Roads. Hampton Roads experienced positive employment growth in 2016
despite the BEA reporting that real GDP growth in that region was

Examining metropolitan area jobs and employment data provides

negative. As a consequence, it should not surprise us if the BEA revises its

conflicting signals about the state of the metro economies. While the

GDP estimate for Hampton Roads upward (more on this later).

employment data suggest robust growth in 2017, jobs data indicate a
slowdown.2 To understand these different signals, let’s first discuss how

Other metropolitan areas showed strong employment growth, with

employment and jobs are measured.

Charlottesville reporting 3 percent growth in 2017. The positive, and in

Employment data come from a monthly survey of households and are more

picked up in 2017 inside several of Virginia’s metro areas.

some cases strong, employment growth suggests that economic activity

sensitive to recent changes in employment, as individuals tend to disclose
immediately whether they are employed or not. Employment data also
capture whether individuals are self-employed or engaged in short-term
employment, such as driving for Uber, working through Thumbtack or
laboring in other parts of the emerging “gig economy.”
On the other hand, the jobs data come from a monthly survey of
employers. Unlike the employment data (which count people), the jobs
data count, as one might suspect, jobs. Therefore, if a person holds
multiple jobs with multiple employers, each employer will report the
2 T
 he Current Population Survey (CPS) covers households and asks whether an individual was employed or
actively seeking employment. The Current Employment Survey (CES) covers businesses and reports the
number of jobs. An individual who is employed with two jobs would be counted once in the CPS and twice in
the CES. The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the CPS for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The BLS conducts the
CES.

3 This occurs because the jobs data would count each of the jobs separately, while the employment data would
only count the same individual once.
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GRAPH 1
GRAPH 1
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Northern
Virginia

(not seasonally adjusted data), 2017
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Richmond
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Are there more jobs in Virginia’s metropolitan areas? The data here

Nevertheless, can we explain why there are such large differences between

paint a different picture. Recall from chapter 1 that job growth for the

jobs and employment data in several of Virginia’s metropolitan areas?

Commonwealth slowed from 2 percent in 2015 to 1.6 percent in 2016 to 1.5

One possible explanation is the impact of the Great Recession. In the

percent in 2017. Graph 2 compares 2016 metro area job growth with 2017

immediate aftermath of the Great Recession, the number of part-time

year-to-date job growth.

jobs soared as individuals took on additional jobs. Nationally, part-time

Year-to-date job growth in 2017 has slowed in each of Virginia’s large
metropolitan areas when compared to 2016. While Northern Virginia and
Richmond continued to add jobs, albeit at a slower pace, job growth stalled
in Hampton Roads. Because these three metro areas contain 73 percent
of all jobs in the Commonwealth, slow job growth regionally translated
into slow growth for the state.
There is, however, some good news. Job growth in 2017 for Harrisonburg
has remained well above the state average even though it slowed from
2016. Blacksburg, Charlottesville, Lynchburg and Roanoke all saw signs of
stronger job growth in 2017.
Graph 3 presents employment and jobs growth in Virginia’s metro areas
between January and September 2017. One can immediately see that
depending on one source of labor market data could result in strikingly
different conclusions. In Hampton Roads, for example, employment is up

employment peaked in January 2010 at 20.1 percent of all jobs. The ratio
of part-time to full-time jobs in September 2017 was 17.9 percent, still
above the average ratio prior to the recession.4 In areas with a larger
federal government presence (Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia),
sequestration also undoubtedly played a role. As these two metro
economies continue to recover, it seems likely that they have experienced
slower part-time job growth relative to full-time jobs, and this has caused
their job growth to lag their employment growth.
Another explanation is the emergence of the contract or “gig economy.”
More Americans are employed as contractors than at any previous point
in history, with some estimates suggesting that more than 40 percent
of American workers have contingent jobs.5 Rapidly increasing levels of
self-employment (whether by choice or not) would be reflected in the
employment data, but not in the jobs data. Large urban metro areas are
common locations for freelancers (though there is some recent evidence

1.2 percent, yet the number of jobs is stagnant.

that more freelancers are choosing smaller metros and rural areas).

The Richmond and Northern Virginia metropolitan areas also exhibit

of these phenomena. Neither of these “gigs” would show up in the jobs

large differences in the employment and jobs data. Employment in

data, but the individuals occupying these jobs would consider themselves

Northern Virginia increased by 2.7 percent while jobs grew by 1.7 percent.

employed and answer when surveyed.

Richmond also reported employment growth of 2.7 percent, and jobs
there increased 1.6 percent. Charlottesville saw robust employment and
job growth with 3 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. In Harrisonburg,
the employment and job growth were the same at 2.6 percent. We can
conclude that jobs and employment are growing in many of Virginia’s
metro areas but nevertheless one should avoid relying solely upon one
measure of the labor market over another.

Driving for Uber or selling your wares on Etsy are two illustrations

As contract work and freelance work become more prevalent,
accurately measuring employment and jobs will become more
complicated. These discordant measures do not mean that we should
throw our hands up and quit in frustration. If anything, the data
illustrate the need to dive deeper into the numbers to understand the
underpinnings of economic activity in Virginia. Relying on one measure
may be useful for Twitter or cable television, but not for economic
policy.

4 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-9, Employment Situation Summary.
5 Elaine Pofeldt, “Shocker: 40% of workers now have contingent jobs, says U.S. Government,” Forbes (May 25,
2015).
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GRAPH 2

GRAPH 2
YEAR-TO-DATE JOB GROWTH, 2016 AND 2017

Year-to-Date Job Growth, 2016 and 2017
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0.2%
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey (not seasonally adjusted data), 2017
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Metro Area Wages

quarter of 2016. Charlottesville stands out with double-digit wage growth.

Politicians of all stripes promise that their policies will improve wages.

Column 2 displays the growth in wages from 2015 to 2016, while column

The other metros also experienced wage growth according to this measure.

However, one problem is that wage growth can be measured in different
ways, and wages, much like metropolitan area GDP, are measured
with a considerable time lag. 2017 is almost over and the most recent
metropolitan area wage data are for the first quarter of 2017. We present
three measures of wage growth for Virginia’s metro areas in Table 2. As
with our discussion in the previous section, we dive into the numbers to
see if any consistent pattern emerges across Virginia’s metro areas.
Column 1 presents what is commonly referred to as year-over-year wage
growth. This measure represents an annual growth rate calculated by
comparing wages in the first quarter of 2017 with wages in the first

3 presents the growth rate in wages between 2012 and 2016. The picture
here is one of slowing wage growth across most metro areas. Wages, for
example, grew only 0.6 percent in 2016 in Hampton Roads, slower than
the growth rate from 2012 to 2016. Only Lynchburg and Winchester
maintained average wage growth in 2016. The story that emerges is that
wages grew faster earlier in the decade and growth slowed in 2016.
The conclusions from this data set are mixed and perhaps a bit confusing.
The data in column 1 suggest a labor market that is tightening and wages
that are growing above the recent rate, but the other columns suggest
something different. Cautious optimism is the order of the day, given the
rather disappointing numbers for some metro areas in 2017 Q1 and the
slower rate of wage growth in 2016 when compared to 2012-2016.

TABLE 2
WAGE GROWTH IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS

survey of employers – that provides yet another scenario. These data paint

(1)

(2)

(3)

2016 Q1-2017 Q1
Growth

2015-2016
Growth

2012-2016 CAGR

United States

6.6%

1.3%

2.1%

2016. Moreover, the growth rates in all but three metro areas (Blacksburg,

Virginia

6.8%

1.1%

1.5%

Roanoke and Northern Virginia) outpaced existing inflation. The other

Blacksburg

6.3%

1.2%

1.4%

six metro areas of the state saw real wage growth during the first eight

Charlottesville

11.6%

0.6%

2.3%

Hampton Roads

5.3%

0.6%

1.8%

How you interpret these data depends on where you stand. A pessimist

Harrisonburg

4.5%

0.0%

1.5%

might argue that wage growth is not only slowing, but has turned

Lynchburg

7.3%

1.8%

1.8%

negative in some metropolitan areas. An optimist would point to

Northern
Virginia

6.6%

0.8%

1.2%

The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Wages appear to be rising in

Richmond

8.6%

1.0%

1.6%

Roanoke

4.5%

1.6%

2.0%

Winchester

7.5%

1.8%

1.8%

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Virginia Employment Commission, QCEW Wages. CAGR is the
Compound Annual Growth Rate.

46

To further confound, there is an alternative source of wage data – the
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a solid picture of wage growth in the metropolitan areas through August
2017 (see Graph 4). All metro areas, except Blacksburg, experienced wage
growth through August 2017 when compared to the same period from

months of 2017. Good news indeed.

double-digit wage growth and trumpet the progress Virginia is making.
most of the metro areas, but wage growth slowed in 2017, which is
alarming as wages should be rising as we approach full employment. If
wage growth is slowing, this is indeed disconcerting, as many metros
are approaching what typically has been considered full employment.

GRAPH 4

GRAPH 4

METRO AREA WAGE GROWTH IN 2017 (YEAR TO DATE)

Metro Area Wage Growth in 2017 (Year to Date)
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Taxable Sales
Another viable measure of economic activity is taxable sales. More than
two-thirds of the total spending in the U.S. economy comes in the form
of consumption. Taxable sales capture most of this activity, though it is
important to note that not all conventional sales are taxable and numerous
economic exchanges go unrecorded.
Consumption levels in Virginia have increased each year since 2009.

TABLE 3

Residents of the Commonwealth consumed approximately $42,000 of goods
and services per person in 2016, up from $40,000 in 2015.6 Unfortunately,
we do not have recent data on consumption spending within Virginia’s

METRO AREA AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN TAXABLE SALES
(THROUGH AUGUST OF EACH YEAR)

metropolitan areas. Instead, we have data on taxable sales within metros,

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

but as noted, this measure will miss some forms of consumption spending.

2014

2015

2016

2017

20042007
Average
Annual

Blacksburg

4.2%

1.6%

1.9%

0.9%

5.9%

Charlottesville

6.4%

3.2%

6.3%

2.6%

5.4%

Harrisonburg

4.6%

2.3%

5.7%

4.1%

4.7%

Lynchburg

6.6%

1.8%

3.2%

1.3%

6.4%

periods are consistent. Table 3 presents taxable sales growth rates for

Richmond

5.5%

4.4%

0.9%

4.5%

6.4%

data through August of each year. Columns 1 through 4 show growth

Roanoke

4.7%

3.0%

0.2%

1.9%

4.4%

rates for 2014-2017 through August of each year. Column 5 shows the

Hampton
Roads

1.8%

3.7%

1.8%

2.9%

5.1%

average annual growth rate for the prerecession period 2004-2007 as a
comparison.

Winchester

3.9%

2.5%

5.2%

4.6%

4.0%

Two things stand out. First, taxable sales growth between 2014 and 2017

Northern
Virginia

-0.5%

4.6%

2.6%

2.9%

4.1%

Taxable sales growth predictably rises during business cycle expansions
and falls during business cycle contractions. However, taxable sales growth
at the metropolitan level usually leads the business cycle, and this makes it
a valuable leading indicator of future economic conditions.
At the time of publication, data were only available for the metropolitan
areas through August 2017. Taxable sales data are highly seasonal and
so it is important when comparing across time to ensure that the time

was positive, suggesting a growing economy. Second, though taxable
sales grew each year between 2014 and 2017, the growth rates lagged the
average annual taxable sales growth during the prerecession period. So,
the metropolitan areas experienced taxable sales growth the past four
years, but that growth was slower than they experienced prior to the
recession.

6 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures by States, October 2017.
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Source: Center for Economic and Policy Studies, Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, University of
Virginia

Is GO Virginia Going
Anywhere?

firms increase productivity and tap new markets. Innovation is also at the
core of establishment creation. We are hopeful but must await further
funding and the results of actual projects to make firm statements about
the benefits of GO Virginia and VRIF.

Lawmakers and other regional leaders have had a marked change in
heart with regard to economic development policy in recent years. They
have been taking a much more aggressive and proactive stance. Virginia’s
lawmakers approved two new initiatives during the 2016-17 General
Assembly session – GO Virginia and the Virginia Research Investment
Fund (VRIF). Both programs aim to create high-wage jobs in industries
of strength. Another goal of both programs is collaboration. The lack
of regional cooperation and collaboration is frequently mentioned as an
inhibiting factor to growth.
GO Virginia incentivizes collaboration by providing state funds for
initiatives that have at least two separate localities participating. The
program organizes Virginia into nine regions, each with a regional council
that scores proposals submitted from business, academia, localities and
regional organizations. The first round of proposals was not yet submitted
at the time of publication, so we are unable to comment on benefits that

VIRGINIA INITIATIVE FOR

GROWTH &
OPPORTUNITY
IN' EACH ,REUs,oN

may accrue to the regions. However, the process of regional collaboration
is likely to stimulate beneficial economic activity with or without funding
through GO Virginia.
VRIF is designed to stimulate commercialization of research conducted
at universities. The program provides state funds and bonding authority
to renovate, purchase or build research labs and research equipment.
The final budget bill in the 2017 General Assembly session designated
$4 million for VRIF in FY 2017 and $8 million in FY 2018 as well as
$29 million in bonding authority.7 A small amount for the task at hand.
We believe that both programs address a critical weakness in the Virginia
economy at present – innovation. Innovation is at the core of modernday economic development. Innovation enhances productivity, creates
value and increases wages. Innovation is not just about entrepreneurship,
however. It is important for existing companies as well. It helps those
7 S
 tate Council of Higher Education for Virginia, Virginia Research Investment Fund, http://www.schev.edu/
index/institutional/grants/va-research-investment-fund.
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Concluding Remarks
If one were to view the regional metropolitan economies as the pistons
that drive the economic growth engine in Virginia, then it is clear from
an economic perspective that not all the pistons are firing at the same
time and with the same strength. The problem is that we cannot point
to one malady for the stops and starts of the regional economies in the
Commonwealth. Sequestration and the caps on defense spending have
hindered federal spending in Hampton Roads. The declining importance of
mining and forestry has hurt southwestern Virginia. The textile industry
has almost disappeared in Southside Virginia. Meanwhile, Richmond has
accelerated modestly ahead of the Commonwealth’s other regions.
There are strands of good news even amid the pinging and stalling of
the economic engine. Both employment and jobs are up in most of the
metropolitan areas, though their growth appears to have tapered off in
2017. Wage data suggest a tightening labor market and this could boost
wages throughout 2017. Taxable sales continue to grow in most metro
areas but, as with the labor market, growth appears to be declining in
2017. Not only is economic growth in Virginia overall stuck in neutral,
there is also a distinct possibility that many metro areas may be shifting
into reverse.
GO Virginia is a step in the right direction, but a small step. The
amount of funding for GO Virginia is too small relative to the task
at hand. Further, rather than spending scarce public funds upon lowlikelihood attempts to woo large employers, or heavily subsidizing private
development, or investing in large, economically unproductive showcase
projects, Virginia should invest in projects that spur innovation and
in the commercialization of products and technology coming from its
federal laboratories and universities. Attention also should be devoted to
providing incentives that might bolster the Commonwealth’s below-thenational-average rate of new business formation.
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If GO Virginia truly spurs regional cooperation, then the Commonwealth
should seriously consider large increases in GO Virginia funding to
encourage regional economic growth. This assumes that the regional
projects put forward have sound economic bases rather than representing
predictable grabs at what some may view as a proverbial Christmas tree
full of presents.
What does the future hold? Virginia’s regional economies, except
for Richmond, appear to be decelerating. While increased federal
spending may be on the horizon, political uncertainty may push such
increases well into 2018. We believe that concerted political action
to alleviate burdensome regulations, promote long-term investment
and improve regional cooperation is needed now. This is hardly a new
recommendation, but one we need to repeat until the Commonwealth
climbs out of its current rut.

51

THE SCOURGE OF
OPIOIDS IN THE
COMMONWEALTH
So consider the amount of standard daily
doses of opioids consumed in Japan. And
then double it. And then double it again.
And then double it again. And then double it
again. And then double it a fifth time. That
would make Japan No. 2 in the world, behind
the United States.
– Kevin Humphreys, Professor of Psychiatry
and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford
University, 2017
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take care of him. Police quickly administered

before, as the mother was no longer able to

seat, had been granted custody only six weeks

grandmother, who was in the front passenger

destructive nature of opioid abuse. The child’s

over for driving erratically, illustrates the

The picture, taken after the driver was pulled

epidemic – opioid abuse and addiction.

many Americans to what has become a raging

reprinted here, this photo opened the eyes of

mouth agape. Published in September 2016 and

unconscious adults in the front seat, each with

the back seat of an automobile staring at two

that quickly went viral – a confused child in

and unforgettable picture (see next page)

attention last year. It featured a heart-rending

One episode of opioid abuse gained widespread

many cases, death.

opioids can result in hospitalization and, in

When used inappropriately or abused, however,

situations that range from arthritis to surgery.

individuals to reduce or avoid pain in medical

supervised by physicians, opioids enable

legitimate uses. When prescribed and

Opioids are painkillers and have many

from opioids.

Virginians are dying in ever-greater numbers

“epidemic” or “emergency,” one point is clear:

deaths and hospitalizations is called a “crisis,”

deaths. Regardless of whether the number of

Virginia surged past gun- and vehicular-related

Over the past decade, opioid overdose deaths in

and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

accidental death in the United States

pioids are the leading cause of
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Narcan to counter the effects of the apparent opioid overdose and then
arrested the grandmother and driver for child endangerment. The young
child now lives with distant relatives in another state. We don’t know
what opioids were used nor do we know if the adults in the car have found
the right treatment to combat their addiction. What is becoming clear,
however, is that opioids are wreaking havoc on communities, and children
are especially vulnerable.
Unfortunately, events like this are increasingly common and raise
troubling questions. Were the opioids prescribed or obtained illegally?
What happens to children whose parents or guardians fall into the grips of
opioid abuse or addiction? What are the financial consequences of illegal
opioid use?
Often, there are more questions than answers when opioid addiction is
the subject of discussion. One thing that we do know for certain, however,
is that the misuse and abuse of opioids have led to a crisis that has left a
destructive imprint on the Commonwealth and the United States. Graph
1 illustrates the disheartening growth in drug overdose deaths in Virginia.
The number of opioid-related deaths has almost doubled over the last
decade. Opioid overdose was not only the leading cause of accidental
death in Virginia in 2016, but also responsible for an increasing number of
emergency calls and hospitalizations. In this chapter, we outline this crisis
and suggest a plan of action.

Source: Alice Park, “The Story Behind the Viral Photo of an Opioid
Overdose,” Time (Jan. 24, 2017)
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GRAPH 1
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF DEATHS DUE TO ALL DRUG OVERDOSES:
Graph
1
VIRGINIA,
2007-2016
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Opioids: A Primer
Opioids can be natural substances that reduce pain, such as opium or
morphine, both of which come from poppy plants. They also can be
synthesized from opium and morphine into other forms, such as heroin.
Opioids, as well, can be manufactured into a wide variety of legitimate
products that either are prescribed by physicians, or can be purchased
over the counter.
As is true for common and legitimate drugs, opioids come in five major
forms: tablets, capsules, nasal sprays, patches and liquids. The key
ingredients of most opioids used in the United States come either from
South America or Mexico. Even though perhaps 90 percent of the world’s
heroin is cultivated in Afghanistan, only about 4 percent of heroin in the
U.S. came from Afghanistan in 2013.1

makes this drug so dangerous is that it typically appears as a dry, white
powder, is hard to detect when mixed with other illicit drugs, and even
a very small dose (0.6 milligrams) is fatal. To put this into perspective,
the U.S. government only authorized production of 10 grams a year
of Carfentanil versus 1,750 kilograms of fentanyl in 2017.3 From
October 2016 to June 2017, Customs and Border Protection seized almost
2 kilograms of the drug, illustrating the stark difference between legal
production and illegal importation.4
Consistent opioid use, even when prescribed legitimately by a physician,
can lead to physical dependence. As dependence increases, individuals
may find themselves less willing or able to work and participate in society.
Habitual use or abuse of opioids such as heroin and fentanyl may result
in unintended death. While the withdrawal from opioids is generally not
fatal, there are substantial physical and financial costs involved in the
treatment of opioid addiction.

Synthetic opioids such as oxycodone (OxyContin), hydromorphone
(Dilaudid) and hydrocodone (Tussionex) are made by changing the

TABLE 1

chemical structure of naturally occurring opioids.2 The starting point,

THE MOST COMMON OPIOIDS

however, is a naturally occurring opioid such as opium or morphine.
Table 1 reports the most common opioid varieties.
Fentanyl, an opioid that is 50 to 100 times more potent than morphine,
offers dramatic pain relief but is also causing an increasing number
of opioid deaths in the Commonwealth and the United States. Like

Methadone

Vicodin, Lorcet, Lortab
(hydrocodone)

Dilaudid
(hydromorphone)

Percocet, Percodan,
OxyContin (oxycodone)

Demerol (pethidine)

Duragesic (fentanyl)

Source: Opioids, National Institute on Drug Abuse, www.drugabuse.gov

most opioids, fentanyl has legitimate uses. It is used to combat pain during
surgeries and fentanyl patches provide localized pain relief. It also can
be taken by means of a nasal spray or injection. Used recreationally and
abusively, however, it can be fatal.
In the summer of 2016, an increasing number of overdoses and deaths
appeared related to a derivative of fentanyl, Carfentanil. Carfentanil is
typically used to sedate large animals, such as elephants and rhinoceroses.
While fentanyl is up to 100 times more potent than morphine,
Carfentanil is up to 10,000 times more potent than morphine. What
1 “ The Drug Addiction Pipeline: Who Supplies Drugs to America?” The Recovery Village, https://www.
therecoveryvillage.com/drug-addiction/who-supplies-drugs-america.
2 CAMH: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health. www.camh.ca/en/hospital/health_information/a_z_mental_
health_and_addiction_information/oxycontin/Pages/opioids_dyk.aspx.

56

■ THE SCOURGE OF OPIOIDS IN THE COMMONWEALTH

3 https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2016-23988.pdf.
4 Angela M. Hill, “This elephant tranquilizer is killing people, but no one knows how many.” Sept. 25, 2017,
http://www.wkbw.com/longform/getting-a-fix-carfentanil-is-an-elusive-killer.

Opioid-Related Fatalities

than 27 million Americans used illegal drugs or violated the terms of their
prescription in 2015.9 These are grim statistics.

Deaths attributable to opioid misuse or abuse have been rising rapidly.
In Virginia, 1,138 people died from an opioid overdose in 2016, a 40
percent rise from the 811 opioid overdose deaths in 2015.5

Monica Beaudry, the 23-year old daughter of a retired Hampton Roads
naval officer, died from a heroin overdose in December 2016. She

An International Perspective
There is no way to sugarcoat the numbers. Fueled primarily by overly
permissive opioid prescription practices, Americans use far more opioids
than the citizens of any other nation. Graph 3 compares the average daily

became addicted, tried rehabilitation programs, but ultimately was

consumption of opioids per 1 million inhabitants from 2013 to 2015 for a

unable to overcome her addiction. Her story is discouragingly typical.

selection of developed countries. Americans consumed 138 percent more

See Scott Daugherty, “Forever Changed: Family Wants Justice

opioids than Canadians, 394 percent more than residents of the United

for Daughter Who Overdosed 9 Months After Trying Heroin,” The
Virginian-Pilot (May 18, 2016).

Kingdom, 631 percent more than Italians and 3,890 percent more than
residents of Japan.
Why does the United States (and Canada) stand out for legitimate opioid

By no means is this solely a Virginia problem. Nationwide, opioids were

usage? Compared to other industrialized nations, there appears to be a

directly responsible for the deaths of 53,000 people in 2016, almost 15,000

lower regulatory burden with regards to the prescription and dispensation

more than in 2015. Graph 2 illustrates the rapid growth in overdose

of prescription opioids for medical issues. Nonmedical uses of opioids are

deaths involving opioids between 2000 and 2016 in the United States.

also significantly higher. Finally, opioid prescriptions are typically covered

Fentanyl-related deaths in the U.S. grew by 540 percent over the past

by health insurance, unlike many other industrialized countries.10

6

three years and are expected to increase again in 2017.

While opioid use is merely problematic in countries such as Sweden

Physicians wrote more than 320 million opioid prescriptions to over

and Spain, it is reaching catastrophic proportions in the United States.

61 million Americans in 2016.7 Opioid deaths frequently begin with a

Clearly, the dynamics of opioid possession and use are different in the

legitimate prescription from a physician that was intended to reduce a

United States than in other developing countries. We stand out like in the

patient’s pain. Four out of five heroin abusers started their opioid use

proverbial sore thumb.

with a legitimate prescription received from a physician. Even so, only 27
8

percent of those taking opioids today are using their own prescription; the
majority obtain their supply of opioids from other sources. A recent report
issued by the surgeon general of the United States estimated that more

5 V
 irginia Department of Health, Medical Examiner, Forensic Epidemiology, http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/
medical-examiner/forensic-epidemiology.
6 Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/health_
policy/monthly-drug-overdose-death-estimates.pdf.
7 CDC National Center for Injury Prevention and Control. 2017. Annual Surveillance Report of Drug-Related
Risks and Outcomes, United States.https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-cdc-drug-surveillancereport.pdf.
8 Marc Siegel, “Opioids Shouldn’t Be a Doctor’s First Resort,” The Wall Street Journal (March 28, 2017).

9 Addiction in America. Surgeon General’s Report. Department of Health and Human Services (2016).
10 Benedikt Fischer, Annette Keates, Gerhad Buhringer, Jens Reimer and Jurgen Rehm. 2014. Non-medical use
of prescription opioids and prescription opioid-related harms: why so markedly higher in North American
compared to the rest of the world? Society for the Study of Addiction (109) 2, 177-181.
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GRAPH 2
OPIOID OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999-2016
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GRAPH 3
GRAPH 3

Estimated Average Consumption of Opioids, 2013-2015

ESTIMATED AVERAGE CONSUMPTION OF OPIOIDS, 2013-2015:
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When Is Opioid Use Illegal?
Opioids typically are prescribed by licensed medical practitioners to
individuals who complain of acute or chronic pain resulting from disease,
surgery or injury. Opioids also are prescribed to people with moderate to
severe coughs and diarrhea.
Methadone and buprenorphine are “substitute” opioids prescribed to
treat addiction to other opioids, such as heroin or oxycodone. Addicts are
provided with a consistent, legal supply of these drug substitutes, with the
aim of gradually weaning them off an uncontrolled opioid such as heroin.
Success in this regard has been mixed.
The use of prescription opioids for anything other than their medical
purpose is illegal. Much attention is given to the abuse of illegal opioid
drugs such as heroin, but the reality is that some of the most commonly
abused opioids are prescription drugs, including fentanyl, Tylenol
containing codeine, hydromorphone (Dilaudid), oxycodone (OxyContin,
Percocet and Percodan) and morphine.11
Opioids are sold legally under many different brand names, including
those just listed. At the same time, they exist under different street names.
Some of the well-known brand and street names for opioids are listed in
Table 2.
In many American cities, identifiable illicit street markets exist where
opioids are bought and sold.12 The flourishing nature of these illegal
opioid street markets means not only that they constitute a major source
of income for some participants, but also that they are responsible for
individuals abandoning searches for legitimate employment. Frequently,
one of the sources of the illegal opioid supply is multiple prescriptions that
individuals have obtained from multiple physicians.
On occasion, unethical doctors operate “pill mills” and write substantial
numbers of prescriptions either to addicts or to middlemen who sell them
to drug dealers. Illegal opioids also are purchased on the “dark web”
13

with cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, which renders the transactions
financially untraceable. Recent charges against two men in China
illustrate the linkages between illicit international production of opioids
and the shipment of opioids through Canada for distribution throughout
the United States.14 Ironically, opioids often are shipped inside this country
via the U.S. Postal Service.15

TABLE 2
COMMON STREET AND BRAND NAMES OF OPIOIDS
Street Names (Nonprescribed and Illegal)

Brand Names
(Prescribed)

Captain Cody

Goodfella

Fiorinal with Codeine

Cody

Murder 8

Robitussin A-C

Schoolboy

Tango and Cash

Tylenol with Codeine

Doors & Fours

China White

Empirin with Codeine

Pancakes & Syrup

Friend

Roxanol

Loads

Jackpot

Duramorph

M

TNT

Demerol

Miss Emma

Oxy 80

Actiq

Monkey

Oxycat

Duragesic

White Stuff

Hillbilly Heroin

Sublimaze

Demmies

Percs

OxyContin

Pain killer

Perks

Percodan

Apache

Juice

Percocet

China girl

Dillies

Tylox

Dance fever

Dilaudid

Source: Opioids and Morphine Derivatives, Foundation for a Drug Free World, www.drugfreeworld.org
11 C
 entre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), www.camh.ca/en/hospital/health_information/a_z_mental_
health_and_addiction_information/oxycontin/Pages/opioids_dyk.aspx.
12 Harriet Ryan et al., “How black-market OxyContin spurred a town’s descent into crime, addiction and
heartbreak,” Los Angeles Times (July 10, 2016).
13 David Armstrong, “Illegal Street Drugs, Not Prescriptions, Now Powering Opioid Abuse, Study Finds,”
published on Aug. 25, 2016, www.statnews.com/2016/08/25/fentanyl-street-drugs-cdc.

14 Pete Williams, “Two Chinese nationals charged with selling Fentanyl to U.S. Suppliers,” NBC News (Oct. 17,
2017).
15 http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/the-threat-to-public-safety-in-the-u-s-mail/.
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The Medical Consequences
Of Opioid Use

It is possible to reverse the immediate deadly impact of an opioid

Opioid abuse often has devastating consequences. To the surprise of some,

Marissa J. Levine declared the Virginia opioid addiction crisis a Public

during the past decade, even while the death rates associated with heart

Health Emergency,19 naloxone has been much easier to obtain in the

disease and cancer declined substantially, the death rate associated with

Commonwealth. Amazingly, it can restore breathing to a comatose,

opioid pain medication sharply increased.

headed-for-death individual within two to eight minutes after being

overdose. Naloxone (also known as Narcan) is a drug that can be used
to treat narcotic overdoses in emergency situations. Since Nov. 21, 2016,
when Gov. Terry McAuliffe announced that State Health Commissioner

administered. Now, a wide variety of individuals, including families and
Opioid abuse and addiction nearly always have negative mental and

friends of abusers, can obtain naloxone without a prescription and have it

physical effects, including nausea, vomiting, a weakened immune system,

ready when needed.20 While naloxone addresses the results of opioid abuse

slower breathing rates, comas, increased risk of HIV, infectious diseases,

and not the causes, its greater availability is a positive step forward that

hepatitis, hallucinations, collapsed veins and clogged blood vessels, and

undoubtedly will save lives.

choking.16 Unfortunately, symptoms associated with the withdrawal from
opioids can be almost as terrifying. When someone who is addicted to
opioids stops using the drugs, they likely will exhibit severe withdrawal
symptoms, including anxiety, sweating, insomnia, agitation, tremors,
muscle aches, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and extreme mental and physical
discomfort. These symptoms typically last four to 10 days, although
methadone withdrawal may last longer. Generally, opioid withdrawal is
not medically dangerous or life threatening, though some symptoms can
persist for months.17
The cure is not worse than the disease in the case of opioids; however,
Baldini et al. (2012) found that even positive, well-intentioned opioid
therapy can adversely affect respiratory, gastrointestinal, musculoskeletal,
cardiovascular, immune, endocrine and central nervous systems.18 Further,
the higher the daily dose of a prescribed opioid, the higher the risk of
overdose and accompanying problems, such as fractures, addiction,

A Closer Look At Virginia
Virginia looks reasonably good when compared to other states on drug
overdose death rates. Graph 4 presents data describing overall drug
overdose death rates for a selection of states in 2016. Virginia’s rate is
below the national average and below that of neighboring states (not all
states reported comparable data).
Graph 5 shows that since 2010, the number of total opioid overdose deaths
has more than doubled in Virginia. We need, however, to look deeper
into the numbers. Figure 1 presents information on the fatal overdose
death rate by locality for 2016. Total opioid overdose deaths are higher in
southwestern, northern and coastal Virginia.

intestinal blockages and sedation. Hence, physicians and patients must
weigh the full spectrum of medical risks against a realistic assessment
of observed benefits related to pain reduction. It is not clear that some
physicians understand this responsibility fully.

16 Opioid (Opiates) Abuse and Addiction, http://www.healthline.com/health/opioids-and-relateddisorders#overview1.
17 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration. (2010). Protracted Withdrawal. https://store.
samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA10-4554/SMA10-4554.pdf.
18 Angee Baldini, et al., A Review of Potential Adverse Effects of Long-Term Opioid Therapy. The Primary Care
Companion for CNS Disorders, 2012, doi:10.4088/pcc.11m01326.
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19 O
 ffice of the Governor, “Opioid Addiction Crisis Declared a Public Health Emergency in Virginia,” Nov. 21,
2016.
20 There is now a standing order in Virginia that serves as a prescription for all Virginians to obtain naloxone.
Virginia residents can directly request naloxone from a pharmacy without first having to visit their medical
provider. For further information, see the Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental
Services.
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GRAPH 5

GRAPH 5

TOTAL OPIOID OVERDOSE DEATHS IN VIRGINIA, 2007-2016

Total Opioid Overdose Deaths in Virginia, 2007-2016
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FIGURE 1

RATE OF ALL OPIOID OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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Source: Virginia Department of Health, Quarterly Drug Report, 2nd quarter, 2017
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The Virginia Department of Health reported that prescription opioid
overdoses fell by 6.2 percent from 2011 to 2016.21 Figure 2 depicts
the fatal prescription overdose death rate by localities in Virginia for
2016. There may be a correlation between the number of individuals on
Medicare and Medicaid in Virginia counties and the abuse of prescription
opioids. Southwest Virginia appears to bear a disproportionate burden.
A recent estimate suggested that, for 2013, over 40 percent of Medicaid
spending in southwest Virginia health districts on emergency room and
inpatient hospital services was related to opioid abuse.22
If prescription overdose deaths fell slightly from 2011 to 2016, what is
driving the increase in overall opioid overdose deaths? Much like in the
United States, the recent emergence of fentanyl and fentanyl-heroin
combinations has led to the startling increase in deaths.
We first turn to heroin. From 2007 to 2011, heroin overdose deaths in
the Commonwealth were relatively stable, even declining sharply in 2010.
Since 2010, however, heroin deaths have steadily increased and were
often attributed as the primary cause of opioid overdose fatality until the
emergence of fentanyl. Since 2007, heroin overdose deaths increased 348
percent, and 31 percent from 2015 to 2016. Figure 3 illustrates that heroin
overdoses appear to be concentrated in Northern Virginia, Richmond
and Hampton Roads. From an economic perspective, illicit drug markets
flourish in more population-dense areas, leading to higher rates of illicit
drug overdose in these urban areas.
Graph 7 indicates the sharp rise in fentanyl-related overdose deaths
in Virginia and Figure 4 shows the distribution of deaths throughout
the Commonwealth. From 2007 to 2012, the number of fentanyl deaths
was relatively stable. Since 2012, however, fentanyl deaths in the
Commonwealth have increased by 1,140 percent, including a 176
percent increase from 2015 to 2016. The number of fentanyl deaths is
expected to increase in Virginia in 2017.23

21 Virginia Department of Health. Opioid Addiction Indicators.
22 VCU Health, VCU School of Medicine. “The Opioid Crisis Among Virginia Medicaid Beneficiaries” (January
2016).
23 Virginia Department of Health, Medical Examiner. Fatal Drug Overdose Quarterly Report. October 2017.
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FIGURE 2

FIGURE 2
RATE OF FATAL PRESCRIPTION OPIOID (EXCLUDING FENTANYL) OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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GRAPH 6
GRAPH 6
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FIGURE 3
FIGURE 3
RATE OF FATAL HEROIN OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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GRAPH 7
GRAPH 7

Fentanyl-Related Deaths in Virginia, 2007-2016

FENTANYL-RELATED DEATHS IN VIRGINIA, 2007-2016

700

622

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

48

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: Virginia Department of Health, Medical Examiner, Forensic Epidemiology

10

70

■ THE SCOURGE OF OPIOIDS IN THE COMMONWEALTH

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

FIGURE 4

FIGURE 4

RATE OF FATAL FENTANYL (RX, ILLICIT AND ANALOG) OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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There is more to the story. The cost of opioid addiction and abuse to

Another impact of the opioid crisis is on Emergency Departments (ED)

Virginia is not just measured in the number of overdose deaths. A locality

throughout Virginia. An ED is also known as an Accident & Emergency

may not have any opioid overdose deaths in a given year but may incur

department (A&E), Emergency Room (ER) or Emergency Ward (EW).

significant expenses responding to nonfatal opioid overdoses. Emergency

As the number of overdoses has increased, the number of ED visits for

Medical Services (EMS) units respond to opioid overdose calls and,

treatment has increased, straining scarce resources. As shown in Table

in many cases, administer naloxone (Narcan) to counter the effects

3, visits for heroin overdoses increased by 75 percent from 2015 to 2016.

of an overdose. Graph 8 illustrates the 481 percent rise in naloxone

Non-heroin related overdoses increased by 18 percent for the same

administrations by EMS personnel from 2011 to 2016 for Virginia.

period.26

The administration of naloxone does not come without cost. While it is
a generic drug produced by multiple companies, the price has steadily

TABLE 3

increased over the last five years.24 The cost of a naloxone kit ranges from
$40 to $200, depending on the number and strength of doses. Newer
auto-injectors of naloxone have also become available, with significantly
higher prices, ranging from about $300 to over $3,750 per auto-injector.
The range of possible methods of injecting naloxone makes it difficult

EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS FOR HEROIN AND
OPIOID OVERDOSE, 2015 AND 2016
2015

2016

to estimate the cost, but clearly the cost is likely in the hundreds of

Heroin Overdose

800

1,401

thousands (if not millions) of dollars, especially if one factors in the cost

Opioid Overdose

7,534

8,710

of the drugs, training, and first responder and emergency personnel time.

Source: Virginia Department of Health, Opioid Addiction Indicators, 2017

If one includes the cost to families, the economic consequences associated
with the administration of naloxone are stark.
Even more troubling is that newer opioid combinations require more than
one dose of naloxone. First responders and families are now recommended

“I could feel his pulse coming back slowly, and then it jumped. I’ve seen
firsthand what a miracle this stuff is. I’ve seen people wake up that I didn’t

to have multiple doses of naloxone on hand and, in the case of fentanyl-

think would wake up. I took a class to learn how to use it, and the class

related overdoes, to be prepared to administer these doses. The increasing

was only half an hour. Half an hour to save someone’s life. I think it’s very

potency of opioids not only increases the likelihood of an unintended

important.” – Bob DeTriquet, director of Male Programs at The McShin

overdose, but also the cost to localities and families to save lives.25

Foundation in Richmond, on the ease of the administration of naloxone.
(“Free classes on administering lifesaving drug: ‘I could feel his pulse
come back slowly,’ ” WTVR, July 20, 2017)

24 Meg Tirrell, “As opioid epidemic worsens, the cost of waking up from an overdose soars.” Jan. 4, 2017.
CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/04/as-opioid-epidemic-worsens-the-cost-of-waking-up-from-anoverdose-soars.html.
25 https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/han00384.asp
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26 T
 he data represent visits by Virginia residents to emergency departments for unintentional overdose. Visits
for opioid overdose include visits where the drug causing the overdose was not determined at the time of
the patient’s arrival at the hospital.

GRAPH
8
GRAPH

8

NALOXONE (NARCAN) ADMINISTRATIONS BY EMS PERSONNEL IN VIRGINIA, 2011-2016

Naloxone (Narcan) Administrations by EMS Personnel in Virginia, 2011-2016
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Opiate Addiction And
Employment

labor force said they took painkillers daily and two-thirds of that

Prima facie, opiate misuse or abuse is antithetical to regular, productive

Krueger’s empirical work led him to estimate that about 20 percent of

employment. Even so, because the U.S. economy has now expanded for

the decline in labor force participation rates in the United States can be

more than eight years consecutively, rising opioid use has coincided with

attributed to opioid use and abuse.

rising total employment and falling rates of unemployment. This does not
imply that drug use reduces unemployment; as we have seen, the opposite
is true. What it does mean is that overall economic prosperity sometimes
disguises the relationship between opioid use and unemployment rates.
A statistic that is more relevant to measuring the possible effects
of opioid usage on work activity is the labor force participation rate
(LFPR). LFPRs measure whether individuals of prime working age are
either employed or looking for a job. The relevance of LFPRs to opioid
usage is straightforward: the consensus is that opioid addiction causes
individuals to drop out of the labor force by making them less ambitious,
more lackadaisical and even unresponsive to ordinary labor market
incentives.
It is also true that unemployment rates can be deceptive because an
individual who drops out of the labor force and stops looking for a job is
not counted as unemployed. LFPRs, however, catch this.
The labor force participation rate in the United States for adults 25-54
years old has been on the decline for many years and reached a near 40year low in May 2015 (see Graph 9). As of September 2016, 11.4 million

subset were on prescription medicines. By contrast, just 20 percent of
employed men and 19 percent of unemployed men (but looking for work)
in the same age group reported taking any painkillers (see Graph 10).

If, for whatever reason, many people of prime working age are not
working, then how do they survive? Some successfully claim disability.
Social Security provided disability insurance payments to 8.8 million
beneficiaries in 2016, up from 5.5 million beneficiaries in 2002.28
An increasing proportion of people who have left the labor force
cobble together a combination of sources of support that may include
disability payments, extended family support, as well as charitable gifts,
unemployment insurance, food stamps and perhaps some criminal activity.
They may end up standing on a proverbial street corner, or lounging in a
park – but not in the labor force except on a part-time, temporary or “gig”
basis.
What is the cost of such behavior to the Virginia economy? This is not
easy to measure. If, however, labor force participation rate data in
Virginia have declined 3 percent due to opioid addiction, then the
Commonwealth has experienced between $4.5 billion and $7.6 billion in
lost productivity.29 To put it another way, the lost productivity is at least
equal to 1 percent of the Commonwealth’s gross domestic product for
2017 and may be as high as 1.7 percent.

men between the ages of 25 and 54 were not in the labor force.
Does the decline in labor force participation reflect increasing opioid
usage? Recent work conducted by Alan Krueger of Princeton University,
under the aegis of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, strongly suggests
that this may be so.27 Krueger found that 44 percent of men not in the
27 A
 lan B. Krueger, “Where Have All the Workers Gone?” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper
(Oct. 16, 2016). Also, Katherine M. Keyes et al., “Understanding the Rural-Urban Differences in Nonmedical
Prescription Opioid Use and Abuse in the United States,” American Journal of Public Health (February
2014), www.ajph.aphapublications.org. For nontechnical presentations, see Yoki Noguchi, “Opioid Abuse
Takes a Toll on Workers and Their Employers,” National Public Radio (Jan. 20, 2016), www.npr.org, and
Patrick Gillespie, “The Opioid Crisis Is Draining America of Workers,” CNNMoney (July 27, 2017), www.
money.cnn.com.
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28 S
 ocial Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary (2017). https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/dibStat.
html.
29 In August 2017, Virginia’s labor force numbered 4.33 million individuals. If 3 percent (129,900) of those
workers left the labor force, then our estimate of lost productivity is equal to $35,000*129,900 or $4.55
billion annually. If we use average weekly wages from the 1st quarter of 2016 ($1,129), then our estimate
jumps to $7.63 billion. We obtain data on gross domestic product from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and data on the labor force from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

GRAPH 9
GRAPH 9

Monthly Labor Participation Rate for Adults, 25-54 Years:
MONTHLY LABOR PARTICIPATION RATE FOR ADULTS, 25-54 YEARS:
United States, 1997-2017
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GRAPH 10

Graph 10

PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO TOOK PAINKILLERS THE DAY BEFORE, 2010-2013
(BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS)

Percentage of People Who Took Painkillers the Day Before (By Employment Status)
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Opiate Addiction And Crime
Does opioid abuse or addiction lead to additional crime? The National
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence argues that “drugs and
crime are directly and highly correlated and serious drug use can amplify
and perpetuate preexisting criminal activity.”30 Evidence concerning this
is limited. Most crime rates in many areas of the United States have been
declining in recent years, and hence it is difficult to make the case that the
upward spike in opioid abuse and addiction has had much of an impact on
crime rates. This is not the same as saying there has been no effect, but
rather that many different factors affect crime rates and it is difficult to
extract the precise contribution of opioid abuse to crime rates.
There are two additional observations of importance to make with respect
to opioid addiction and crime rates. First, opioid addicts typically do
not survive for long periods of time and therefore do not remain alive to
commit crimes. Second, the nature of opioid addiction is such that it saps
energy and vitality. One is unlikely to commit crimes when one is semi-

aggregate national cost of opioid addiction and abuse to governments. The
lion’s share of the costs is borne by families, employers and charitable
organizations. Nearly two-thirds of the total economic burden was due to
health care expenses, substance abuse treatment and lost productivity.
We want opioid abusers to seek treatment, but the treatment costs also
can prevent them from doing so. In 2015, the average cost to a patient of
an uncomplicated emergency room visit was $1,124 in Northern Virginia,
$1,105 in central Virginia, $819 in southwest Virginia and $746 in eastern
Virginia.33 Further, the drug substitutes used to move opioid addicts to
a controlled status also can be pricey. The two most widely used drug
substitutes are methadone and Suboxone (buprenorphine); each costs
about $500 per month per individual. These drug substitutes can be
administered in the form of an implant that slowly releases the curative
drug over a period of several months, but this costs around $6,000.34 One
of several goals in instituting a drug substitute program is to reduce the
size of the clandestine drug market, which often is dominated by organized
crime and gangs.

inert.

Other Costs Of Addiction
Drug addicts or abusers frequently end up in hospital emergency rooms
(ERs) and there are costs associated with this. Virginia’s Joint Legislative
Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) estimated that in 2008, untreated
substance abuse resulted in $613 million in public safety expenditures
(police, jail, prison) and health care services by local and regional
governmental units.31 The average hospital stay for those who were
admitted because of drug abuse was 3.8 days in 2010 and their average
treatment cost was $29,497.32 No doubt these numbers are higher today.
It is interesting to note that one well-regarded national study of the
economic cost of opioid abuse attributed only about one-quarter of the
30 Virginia Performs, http://vaperforms.virginia.gov/indicators/publicsafety/crime.php.
31 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, Report to the Governor and the General Assembly of
Virginia, Mitigating the Costs of Substance Abuse in Virginia. http://jlarc.virginia.gov/dfs/reports/Rpt372.pdf
(2008).
32 www.latimes.com/nation/la-sci-sn-opioid-overdose-prescription-hospital-er-20141026-story.html.

33 Virginia Health Information, www.vhi.org/healthcarepricing/procedure.asp?id=ERM22.
34 Matt Gregory, “Drug Addiction: The Cost of a Second Chance” (Feb. 16, 2017), http://drugfreeva.org/drugaddiction-the-cost-of-a-second-chance.
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Policy Considerations
1. The foremost need of citizens, physicians and elected officials is to
acquire more and better information concerning opioid addiction.
This chapter is a step in that direction. Despite the adverse impact
of opioid addiction upon labor force participation and even though
this imposes substantial costs on society, many individuals seem
unaware of the magnitude of the challenges.
2. It is not disputed that some physicians remain uninformed about
the risks of opioids and are insufficiently trained to prescribe them
while managing chronic patient pain. A Boston Medical Center
study examined nearly 3,000 patients who survived an opioidrelated overdose between 2000 and 2012.35 The study found that
more than 90 percent of these patients continued to receive opioid
medications from doctors, even after their overdose. Both physician
and pharmacy education are in order.
3. Additional financial support should be provided for research into
nonaddictive, “selective” painkillers such as PZM21 and BU00028
(both experimental drugs). They offer hope that long-term use of
opioids need not result in addiction.
4. We should create a national prescription registry. A recurring
problem in opiate addiction is the ability of an individual to
obtain multiple opiate prescriptions from multiple physicians.
While there are privacy downsides to a national prescription
registry, the nature of the current crisis suggests that the benefits
accruing from such a registry probably would outweigh the costs by
eliminating the ability of people to obtain repeated and duplicative
prescriptions.

35 Marc R. Larochelle, Jane M. Liebschutz, Fang Zhang, Dennis Ross-Degnan and J. Frank Wharam. “Opioid
Prescribing After Nonfatal Overdose and Association With Repeated Overdose: A Cohort Study of Opioid
Prescribing After Nonfatal Overdose.” Annals of Internal Medicine. American College of Physicians (Jan. 5,
2016).
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5. The medical community should continue to utilize opiate substitute
drugs such as methadone to move opiate addicts away from their
addiction, and drugs such as naloxone to reverse the effects of
opiate drug overdoses. Almost needless to say, such interventions
will require funding if they are to make a difference.
6. Opiate addiction should be regarded as a medical problem. Another
“war on drugs” is not going to improve the opiate situation we face
today.
Finally, it should be apparent that opiate misuse and abuse ultimately
ref lect our society – the values, attitudes, laws, geography and range
of economic opportunities that together make us who we are. Hence,
one cannot press a single button and eliminate the scourge of opiate
addiction because this wave of abuse represents the conjunction of a
set of complex phenomena deep within us. It would take a decade or
more of attention, education and funding to reverse our current dismal
situation, and even this may be too ambitious a goal.
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AIRBNB RISING:
SHORT-TERM RENTALS
AND THE
“GIG ECONOMY”
Uber is redefining the transportation
industry now; Airbnb is doing it to the hotel
industry. You can expect that to happen in
every single industry.
– Masayoshi Son, Chief Executive Officer,
SoftBank
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et there be no doubt. Airbnb is a disrupter.
The international, internet-based firm
that connects owners of rental properties

(“hosts”) with prospective short-term renters
(“guests”) is upending conventional ways of doing
business and in the process challenging the market
positions of the traditional hotel and motel lodging
industry.
Founded in 2008, Airbnb asserts that it is active
in more than 65,000 cities and 191 countries and
that it has facilitated the accommodation of more
than 200 million guests.1 Airbnb claims to have
more than 3 million rental listings worldwide and
its estimated market value exceeded $31 billion in
early 2017.2 Airbnb is now nearly as valuable as
the Marriott International hotel group and almost
twice as valuable as Hilton Worldwide Hotels,
with a workforce that is 1 percent the size of
either hotel chain.3
The Commonwealth has not been left behind.
Airbnb is growing rapidly in many of Virginia’s
major markets and its rise presents challenges
to policymakers and the traditional lodging
sector. In August 2017, 10,395 Airbnb listings
(mostly involving residential homes) were in
Virginia, led regionally by Northern Virginia
with 3,863.4

1 Airbnb, “About Us,” https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us.
2 Lauren Thomas, “Airbnb just closed a $1 billion round and became
profitable in 2016.” March 9, 2017, CNBC. https://www.cnbc.
com/2017/03/09/airbnb-closes-1-billion-round-31-billion-valuationprofitable.html.
3 Maya Kosoff, “Why Airbnb is now almost twice as valuable as Hilton,”
March 20, 2017, Vanity Fair, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/
why-airbnb-is-now-almost-twice-as-valuable-as-hilton.
4 Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017.
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Virtually every new economic phenomenon that upends customary ways of

these sites are not readily available and Airbnb is clearly the dominant

doing business stimulates concerns and the rise of Airbnb is no exception.

player in this growing market.

Conventional hotels and motels question whether Airbnb is “playing by the
rules” and many cities and counties worry that they are not collecting all
taxes due.

Airbnb’s growth in Virginia has been meteoric. Graph 1 illustrates
the almost fivefold increase in Airbnb listings, from 2,023 in October
2014 to 10,395 in August 2017. Graph 2 highlights that total revenue

This chapter analyzes the development of Airbnb and places this

from Airbnb rentals in Virginia rose from $1.52 million to $17.39

phenomenon in the broader context of the rise of the “gig economy” – a

million over the same period. Revenues from Airbnb rentals grew

world in which occasional contractors, part-time workers and temporary

more than 1,000 percent in Virginia in less than three years.

economic arrangements increasingly hold sway. What we are observing
is Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” in action – yet another
example of the never-ending churn in the economic system that drives out
the old and brings in the new.5

7

How does this compare to the traditional lodging sector? Graph 3 shows
that the revenues of Airbnb’s Virginia hosts rose from only 0.49
percent of the revenues of traditional hotels and motels in October
2014 to 4.67 percent in August 2017. This is an almost tenfold
increase over a three-year period.

Airbnb In Virginia

When we examine the performance of the traditional lodging sector, the

To say that the rise of Airbnb is nothing short of remarkable may be

Here we use data from STR Global (formerly known as Smith Travel

an understatement. Starting with the rental of an air mattress in San

Research), a company that provides high-quality data on the performance

Francisco in 2008, Airbnb has rapidly emerged in terms of listings,

of hotels and motels. Comparing October 2014 to August 2017, the

funding and name recognition. Airbnb continues to expand its business

supply of traditional hotel rooms in Virginia increased by only 1.7

model, now offering “experiences” (hosted tours) and an increasing

percent. Revenue for hotels and motels from August 2015 to August

number of connections to travel websites. The Commonwealth is no

2017 only increased by 8 percent.8 While the Airbnb rental sector

exception to the rapid rise of Airbnb and its challenge to the established

may be smaller than the traditional lodging sector, Airbnb is a rising

lodging industry.

competitor.

To track Airbnb’s activities in Virginia, one must rely upon data produced

What kinds of properties are driving this growth in listings and revenue?

by Airdna, a separate and independent organization that generates

Hosts can choose to rent out a portion of their property (known as

numbers and analytics focusing on vacation rental entrepreneurs and

“private room rentals”) or to rent out the entire property (known as

investors. Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise noted, we use data

“entire place rentals”). As displayed in Graph 4, the growth of Airbnb’s

from Airdna to examine the listing, revenue and occupancy of Airbnb-

revenue in Virginia is mostly due to entire place rentals rather than

hosted properties. While there are many other potential short-term rental

private room rentals. Revenues from entire place rentals increased from

hosts, including Flipkey, Homeaway and VRBO, individual listing data for

$1.15 million in October 2014 to $14.98 million in August 2017. While

6

growth in Airbnb listings and revenue becomes even more remarkable.

private room revenues increased sixfold during this period, entire
place revenues increased thirteenfold.
5 J
 oseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) was an Austrian-born economist who spent much of his career at Harvard.
His Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) is considered a classic in the literature of economic
development.
6 As Airbnb does not provide open access to its data, Airdna tracks the performance of listings and predicts
whether properties are booked or not. For more information, see www.airdna.co/methodology.
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7 T
 his is consistent with the reported national Airbnb growth rate in revenues in 2016 of 138 percent. Airbnb’s
revenues grew from an estimated $2.4 billion in 2015 to $5.7 billion in 2016. Chris Kirkham and Greg
Bensinger, “Hotel Group Assails Airbnb Model,” The Wall Street Journal, 269 (March 20, 2017), B4.
8 STR trend reports: Jan. 24, 2017, and Sept. 15, 2017.
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GRAPH 2

GRAPH 2
TOTAL MONTHLY REVENUE
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GRAPH 3

GRAPH 3

RATIO OF AIRBNB’S REVENUE TO TOTAL CONVENTIONAL HOTEL REVENUE:
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017
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Virginia, October 2014 to August 2017
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GRAPH 4
GRAPH 4
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So far, our discussion has focused on Airbnb listings. A listing on Airbnb

of July and Labor Day or in specific locations – for example, Northern

might consist of a shared room, a private room, a studio apartment or

Virginia during special events, such as the presidential inauguration.

several rooms within a house that are available for rent. The number of

During these time periods, Airbnb’s listings surge and it appears that

listings understates the number of rooms available through Airbnb.

the availability of Airbnb as an option discourages conventional hotels

This is an important point to consider when one attempts to estimate the

and motels from increasing their prices as much as they might have in

performance of Airbnb rentals and draw comparisons with traditional

the past. Put simply, it appears that Airbnb reduces the profit margins of

hotels and motels.

conventional hotels and motels during such peak-load periods.

In August 2017, 7,746 (74.5 percent) of the 10,395 Airbnb listings in
Virginia were “active” (actually booked listings) in Airdna’s terminology,
meaning these listings were currently rented or had been rented in the
last month. On average, each active listing in Virginia involved 1.8 rooms.

Airbnb often stresses the role of single-bedroom rentals by its residential
single-family hosts when it interacts with city and county governments.

This means that many of the most active listings for Virginia for the

This provides it with political cover because many elected officials are

period in question were for multiple rooms, confirming that property

reluctant to impose regulations on individual homeowners who believe

listings understate the number of rooms offered for rent. As illustrated

they have the right to use their property as they see fit. While single-

in Graph 5, the share of revenue derived from the rental of properties
involving four or more bedrooms has steadily climbed from about 14
percent in October 2014 to almost 31 percent in August 2017.

room rentals in residential homes may have been the backbone of
Airbnb in its formative days, this no longer holds true. We estimate that
80 percent of Airbnb’s revenues in Virginia Beach are derived from full

Our “more Airbnb rooms than listings” conclusion is consistent with a
recent study conducted for the American Hotel and Lodging Association
by CBRE, a well-known national real estate firm. While the association

houses, apartments and condos, and that 65 percent of these revenues
come from properties with multiple bedrooms.

is hardly a neutral party in terms of its attitudes toward Airbnb, its
commissioned study concluded that one-third of Airbnb’s revenues now
come from individuals and investors who own or control multiple units
(see Graph 6).
When compared to the total number of rooms available in traditional
hotels and motels in Virginia, Airbnb’s active listings of rooms in August
2017 was less than 9 percent of the total. To some this might suggest
that the fears of Airbnb are overstated, but we must draw attention to
the fact that Airbnb is less than 10 years old. Imagine if the number of
hotel rooms increased by 9 percent in less than 10 years in Virginia; this
would represent a remarkable growth in the number of hotels and motels.
We are confident in our conclusion that Airbnb (and similar firms) have

The American Hotel and Lodging Association fervently argues that firms
such as Airbnb functioning in the short-term rental arena are hotels for
all intents and purposes, albeit ones that often do not have to comply with
all the rules and regulations confronting standard hotels. Not surprisingly,
the association advocates a legal and enforcement crackdown on Airbnb
and similar firms, which increasingly have become viable competitors to
the association’s members. The association’s reaction in this regard is like
that observed when any established industry is confronted with a new
viable competitor that appears to be upending previously well-established
rules. Witness the reactions of taxicab companies to Uber and Lyft,
established commercial banks to internet competitors such as Synchrony

become an integral part of the lodging market in Virginia.

and Quicken, some universities to online learning sites and of course

Airbnb’s greatest impact on the conventional hotel and motel market

Google.

dozens of competitors across many industries to Amazon, Facebook and

in Virginia occurs either during peak tourist times, such as the Fourth
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GRAPH 5

GRAPH 5

SHARE OF AIRBNB REVENUE ACCOUNTED FOR BY FOUR OR MORE BEDROOMS IN HOMES:
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017

Share of Airbnb Revenue Accounted for by Four or More Bedrooms in Homes:
Virginia, October 2014 to August 2017
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The Rapid Growth Of Airbnb
In Virginia’s Metro Areas
We now turn to examining the rise of Airbnb in Virginia’s metropolitan
areas (MSAs). On average, these metro areas account for about 91
percent of total hotel revenue and 90 percent of total Airbnb revenue.
Because of how STR Global defines hotel markets and how the Bureau of
Economic Analysis defines MSAs are somewhat different, we combine the
Harrisonburg and Staunton/Waynesboro metro areas into one market.
Since we are only examining Airbnb in the Commonwealth, the data for
the Kingsport-Bristol MSA represent only the Virginia portion of this
metro area.
Airbnb represents a growing share of the lodging market in each of
Virginia’s metropolitan areas. Graph 7 displays the revenues of Airbnb
hosts in August 2017. Hampton Roads generated the largest amount of
revenue in August 2017 ($4.83 million), followed closely by Northern
Virginia ($4.10 million). The Virginia portion of the Kingsport-Bristol
MSA had the lowest amount of total monthly revenue, slightly less than
that of Roanoke.
When we examine the share of Airbnb revenue to hotel revenue,
however, a different story emerges from the data. While Charlottesville’s
total Airbnb revenue for August 2017 was only about $2.5 million, this
amounted to almost 22 percent of total hotel and motel revenues in that
region. Lynchburg’s total Airbnb revenue for August 2017 was $780,000,
but this was equivalent to 15 percent of the total revenue of the traditional
lodging sector in that area. While many believe that Airbnb is limited
to dense, urban markets, Graph 8 shows that, as a percentage of hotel
revenue, Airbnb is performing well in less urbanized markets.
Because Charlottesville and Lynchburg stand out, let’s take a closer look
at those metro areas. Over the past two years, the number of hotel rooms
in Lynchburg has remained constant, with about 2,700 rooms available
for rent. Hotel revenues in Lynchburg increased about 7 percent between
August 2015 and August 2017, slightly below the 8 percent average
growth rate for the Commonwealth. Charlottesville, on the other hand,
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has seen its supply of hotel rooms grow by about 6.5 percent, while hotel
revenues grew by about 19 percent over the same period. The traditional
lodging sector is underperforming the Commonwealth in Lynchburg, but
outperforming it in Charlottesville.
What happened to Airbnb during the same period? In Lynchburg,
available Airbnb listings grew from 54 in October 2014 to 479 in August
2017, an increase of 787 percent (Graph 9). Booked listings grew from
36 to 348 for the same period, an increase of 867 percent. Total revenue
from Airbnb-related rentals in Lynchburg jumped from about $30,000
to $780,000 in the same period, a twenty-sixfold increase in less than
three years (Graph 10).
In Charlottesville, available Airbnb listings grew from 323 in October 2014
to 1,052 in August 2017, an increase of 226 percent (Graph 11). Booked
listings grew from 218 to 883, an increase of 305 percent over the same
period. Total revenue from Airbnb rentals increased from about $380,000
to $2.47 million, an increase of 550 percent (Graph 12). Not only were
more listings available for rent in Lynchburg and Charlottesville, but
also a higher percentage of listings were rented over time.
What is driving the revenue growth in Lynchburg and Charlottesville?
In Lynchburg, revenues from entire place rentals increased by almost
3,370 percent in less than three years (Graph 13). For the same period,
Charlottesville saw an increase of about 600 percent in Airbnb revenues
from entire place rentals (Graph 14). As with the Commonwealth, the
rise in entire place rentals is driving the rapid growth in the Airbnb
rental market.

GRAPH 7

GRAPH 7
REVENUES OF AIRBNB HOSTS IN VIRGINIA AND ITS MAJOR METROS IN AUGUST 2017
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GRAPH 8

GRAPH 8

RATIO OF AIRBNB’S REVENUE TO HOTEL REVENUE IN VIRGINIA AND ITS MAJOR METROS IN AUGUST 2017

Ratio of Airbnb’s Revenue to Hotel Revenue in Virginia and Its Major Metros in August 2017
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GRAPH 9
AVAILABLE AND BOOKED LISTINGS
GRAPH 9OF ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES:
LYNCHBURG, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017

Available and Booked Listings of All Airbnb Properties: Lynchburg, October 2014 to August 2017
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GRAPH 10

GRAPH 10

TOTAL MONTHLY REVENUE FROM ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES:
LYNCHBURG, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017 (MILLIONS OF $)

Total Monthly Revenue from all Airbnb Properties:
Lynchburg, October 2014 to August 2017 (Millions of $)
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GRAPH 11

GRAPH 11

AVAILABLE AND BOOKED LISTINGS OF ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES:
CHARLOTTESVILLE, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017

Available and Booked Listings of All Airbnb Properties:
Charlottesville, October 2014 to August 2017
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GRAPH
12
GRAPH

12

TOTAL MONTHLY REVENUE FROM ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES:
Total Monthly
from all2017
Airbnb
Properties:
CHARLOTTESVILLE,
OCTOBER Revenue
2014 TO AUGUST
(MILLIONS
OF $)

Charlottesville, October 2014 to August 2017 (Millions of $)
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Source: Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017
Source: Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017
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GRAPH 14

GRAPH 14

AIRBNB’S REVENUE FROM ENTIRE PLACE AND PRIVATE ROOMS:
Airbnb’sOCTOBER
Revenue 2014
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and(MILLIONS
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Some Measures Of The
Performance Of Hotels
And Airbnb

previously, we need to calculate on a similar basis for Airbnb’s rentals
because its listings are not equal to room nights.
How has the traditional lodging sector been performing in Virginia’s
metropolitan areas? We look at data for 2016 and 2017 in the months of
January and July. Typically, the demand for hotel rooms is the lowest in
January and highest in July. As illustrated in Table 1, the Commonwealth

With Airbnb’s rapid increases in listings and revenues, one might conclude

overall and every one of Virginia’s metros saw growth in hotel RevPAR

that its rentals are outperforming the traditional hotel industry. Before we

from January 2016 to January 2017, with the exceptionally large increase

can reach this conclusion, however, we need to compare apples to apples;

for Northern Virginia likely associated with the presidential inauguration

that is, we need to use comparable measures of performance over the

and the Women’s March on Washington. The story is more nuanced when

short term and across traditional lodging sectors.

we compare July 2016 to July 2017. One possible explanation is that

The gold standard of the lodging industry is revenue per available room

Airbnb hosts exit the market when there is low demand and enter the

(RevPAR). RevPAR captures the average revenue received by a host

market when demand is higher. This would limit the ability of hoteliers

per room available and captures both supply and demand influences.

to increase prices during periods of peak demand.

STR Global uses room nights to calculate the measures and, as we noted

TABLE 1
NOMINAL REVPAR FOR HOTELS: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED METROS, 2016 AND 2017
Jan-16

Jul-16

Jan-17

Jul-17

Growth Jan-Jan

Growth July-July

Virginia

$40.51

$84.09

$48.24

$85.17

19.08%

1.28%

Blacksburg

$28.42

$61.34

$28.86

$60.34

1.55%

-1.63%

Charlottesville

$51.12

$98.97

$52.70

$102.09

3.09%

3.15%

Hampton Roads

$26.90

$105.38

$30.85

$108.31

14.68%

2.78%

HarrisonburgStaunton

$34.08

$67.12

$36.45

$67.08

6.95%

-0.06%

Kingsport-Bristol,
VA

$24.00

$49.20

$24.02

$47.54

0.08%

-3.37%

Lynchburg

$35.27

$61.82

$40.26

$55.41

14.15%

-10.37%

Northern Virginia

$55.15

$91.51

$73.45

$94.01

33.18%

2.73%

Richmond

$44.15

$66.28

$45.27

$64.88

2.54%

-2.11%

Roanoke

$29.98

$53.74

$30.90

$53.70

3.07%

-0.07%

Source: STR trend reports: Jan. 24, 2017, and Sept. 15, 2017

99

2017 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT

How did Airbnb hosts fare during this period? As shown in Table 2,

for hotels jumped 33 percent in Northern Virginia in January 2017, Airbnb

RevPAR for Airbnb hosts was lower than that of hotels. Airbnb hosts

RevPAR jumped over 100 percent. These large increases in RevPAR

didn’t earn as much per available room as traditional hoteliers. On the

suggest that Airbnb hosts can not only command higher prices over time

other hand, Airbnb RevPAR increased quite dramatically in Virginia and

for their rooms and houses, but they also are gaining the ability to engage

almost all the metropolitan areas. With few exceptions, RevPAR increased

in “surge pricing” for special events, such as the presidential inauguration.

in every metro area, regardless of the period in question. While RevPAR

TABLE 2
NOMINAL AIRBNB REVPAR: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED METROS, 2016 AND 2017
Jan-16

Jul-16

Jan-17

Jul-17

Growth Jan-Jan

Growth July-July

Virginia

$11.77

$32.95

$19.30

$37.53

63.98%

13.90%

Blacksburg

$6.34

$16.42

$14.10

$27.04

122.40%

64.68%

Charlottesville

$17.74

$34.37

$22.65

$42.07

27.68%

22.40%

Hampton Roads

$9.55

$47.65

$13.52

$45.02

41.57%

-5.52%

HarrisonburgStaunton

$17.32

$26.99

$15.98

$32.06

-7.74%

18.78%

Kingsport-Bristol,
VA

$2.35

$13.89

$3.02

$20.82

28.51%

49.89%

Lynchburg

$7.37

$23.04

$11.18

$34.01

51.70%

47.61%

Northern Virginia

$13.29

$36.27

$26.86

$33.03

102.11%

-8.93%

Richmond

$10.93

$26.50

$18.30

$28.94

67.43%

9.21%

Roanoke

$7.20

$26.18

$9.45

$35.34

31.25%

34.99%

Source: Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017
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Comparing Airbnb In
Virginia Cities To
Out-Of-State Cities

listings, even those markets with relatively large Airbnb listing pools saw
double- and triple-digit growth over this period. Between 2015 and 2016,
the Airbnb market segment in the city of Virginia Beach grew the fastest
of any of the 12 cities listed in Table 3.
Virginia Beach, however, stands out in term of the nature of its rentals.
Using active-listing data from March 2017, Table 4 enables us to see that

How do Virginia cities compare to other markets where Airbnb is
concerned? We have selected cities in six metropolitan regions in other
states where Airbnb is active for comparison. It should be noted that,
since we do not have access to STR data on metropolitan areas outside
of Virginia, all comparisons, including those for cities in Virginia, are
based on Airdna reports. In all the comparator cities, Airbnb listings
grew rapidly from 2011 through 2016 (see Table 3). While some of the
rapid growth can be attributed to the initially small number of the overall

over one-quarter of listings in Virginia Beach were for four-plus bedroom
listings, 10 percentage points higher than the next city, Nashville. This
reflects the existence of many large, four-plus bedroom buildings along the
oceanfront that are rented to large groups for weekends or entire weeks.
Parenthetically, these also tend to be the Airbnb properties that generate
the most complaints concerning unruly behavior, illegal parking, trash and
the like.

TABLE 3
CURRENTLY ACTIVE AIRBNB LISTINGS: SELECTED CITIES, 2011-2016
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Growth
2015-2016

Arlington

30

53

94

178

448

982

119.20%

Charleston

10

28

74

156

395

906

129.37%

Jacksonville

4

8

18

45

132

311

135.61%

Lynchburg

5

..

..

14

74

172

132.43%

Nashville

18

50

147

525

1,600

3,400

112.50%

New Orleans

65

200

545

1,100

2,400

4,600

91.67%

Norfolk

2

6

8

14

63

153

142.86%

Portland

82

226

527

1,100

2,200

3,800

72.73%

Richmond

4

9

25

71

459

642

39.87%

Roanoke

..

1

3

9

38

90

136.84%

Savannah

17

35

106

166

283

619

118.73%

Virginia Beach

1

9

20

47

156

392

151.28%

Source: Airdna reports
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE AIRBNB LISTINGS: SELECTED CITIES, MARCH 2017
Studio

1 Bedroom

2 Bedroom

3 Bedroom

4+ Bedroom

Arlington

6.45%

45.66%

32.37%

9.83%

5.68%

Charleston

4.26%

28.61%

32.60%

23.52%

11.00%

Jacksonville

4.38%

32.50%

34.38%

19.38%

9.38%

Lynchburg

11.84%

28.95%

31.58%

15.79%

11.84%

Nashville

4.50%

22.44%

31.48%

25.80%

15.79%

New Orleans

6.51%

37.22%

34.57%

14.04%

7.66%

Norfolk

5.75%

25.29%

43.68%

14.94%

10.34%

Portland

15.42%

41.59%

27.66%

9.86%

5.48%

Richmond

6.19%

37.61%

28.76%

19.47%

7.96%

Roanoke

8.16%

34.69%

24.49%

24.49%

8.16%

Savannah

4.43%

35.82%

34.75%

15.60%

9.40%

Virginia Beach

6.86%

23.53%

27.45%

16.18%

25.98%

Source: Airdna reports

With respect to occupancy, Arlington leads Virginia cities in terms of its

phenomenon of multiple rooms per listing. Airbnb properties tend to be

average Airbnb occupancy rate (see Table 5). Here, however, we must be

occupied less than traditional hotels, suggesting that many hosts struggle

careful because Airdna listing data ordinarily assume a one-listing, one-

to rent their properties on a consistent basis.

room relationship when the typical listing involves an average of almost
two rooms. Hence, the occupancy data presented in Table 5 are biased
strongly upward – perhaps as much as 100 percent on average. Portland’s
60.33 percent Airbnb occupancy rate, for example, in fourth quarter 2016
may be in the range of 30 to 35 percent.
In general, the less seasonal a market, the higher its average occupancy
rate. Airbnb activity in Arlington is not as closely tied to tourism as it is in
Virginia Beach.
STR data reveal an average occupancy rate of 57.9 percent for
conventional hotels and motels located in Virginia for the fourth quarter
of 2016. The unweighted average Airbnb occupancy rate was 47.8
percent in the same period, but as just noted, this does not consider the
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Remember that RevPAR is revenue per available room and refers to the
average revenue received by a host per room available. Again, however,
we must issue a caution. Airdna’s data report RevPAR per listing and
there usually are multiple rooms attached to a single listing. Consequently,
Airdna’s data are biased strong upward here as well.

TABLE 5
AVERAGE AIRBNB OCCUPANCY RATES: SELECTED CITIES, 2016
1st Quarter

2nd Quarter

3rd Quarter

4th Quarter

Arlington

57.67%

70.67%

66.33%

57.67%

Charleston

43.33%

63.67%

55.00%

44.67%

Jacksonville

64.00%

61.33%

58.33%

58.00%

Lynchburg

30.67%

39.00%

45.00%

44.33%

Nashville

44.00%

59.33%

55.67%

46.67%

New Orleans

47.33%

52.67%

38.00%

43.00%

Norfolk

34.00%

49.33%

53.33%

42.67%

Portland

56.00%

74.00%

84.67%

60.33%

Richmond

38.33%

51.00%

55.33%

51.67%

Roanoke

32.00%

53.67%

58.67%

47.67%

Savannah

48.33%

56.33%

51.67%

44.00%

Virginia Beach

30.33%

52.67%

59.33%

32.33%

Source: Airdna market reports
Note: Smith Travel Research reported a room occupancy rate of 57.9 percent for conventional hotels and motels located in Virginia for fourth quarter 2016.
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With this caveat in mind, we can observe in Table 6 that Arlington once

other cities in this regard because it has the highest percentage of revenue

again leads the Virginia pack, though Lynchburg, Norfolk, Richmond and

earned through listings for four bedrooms or more (see Table 7). Virginia

Virginia Beach all recorded considerably higher growth rates in their

Beach’s share of revenue from four or more bedroom rentals (36.6 percent

RevPARs between 2015 and 2016.

of revenue earned) eclipsed that of all other cities in our sample.

There are two additional inferences we can draw from Table 6. One is

If tax revenue collections are a major concern for cities, then the data

that there is wide dispersion in RevPARs among the cities and in RevPAR

in Table 7 strongly suggest that cities’ attention should be focused on

growth rates as well. The other is that if we were to divide the reported

the multiple-bedroom Airbnb properties. In a city such as Virginia

Airbnb RevPARs by two to take account of the listings versus rooms

Beach, almost three-quarters of all revenue earned by Airbnb hosts is

problem, then the average October 2016 RevPAR of $75.48 in conventional

derived from multiple-bedroom properties,9 while it is 66 percent in

hotels and motels was substantially higher than actual Airbnb RevPAR in

Richmond and almost 63 percent in Arlington.

any of the 12 cities covered.
Turning next to Airbnb revenues, we examine total earnings of Airbnb

9 We estimate that almost 80 percent of the lodging taxes that the city of Virginia Beach collects from Airbnb
hosts is derived from hosts who rent full houses, apartments or condos.

hosts from various rentals in 2016. Virginia Beach stands out from the

TABLE 6
NOMINAL AIRBNB REVPAR PER LISTING: SELECTED CITIES, 2015 AND 2016
May-15

Oct-15

May-16
$

99.82

Oct-16
86.86

Growth Oct-Oct

19.65%

12.80%

Arlington

$

83.43

$

77.00

Charleston

$

97.71

$

92.29

$ 134.11

$ 111.86

37.24%

21.21%

$

$

47.00

26.25%

-8.36%

54.11

$

Growth May-May

Jacksonville

$

42.86

$

51.29

Nashville

$

81.43

$

100.43

$ 128.93

$ 133.14

58.33%

32.57%

New Orleans

$

95.14

$

90.71

$ 106.79

$

86.57

12.24%

-4.57%

Norfolk

$

58.29

$

35.86

$

69.82

$

54.57

19.79%

52.19%

Portland

$

70.71

$

79.14

$

84.11

$

77.43

18.94%

-2.17%

Richmond

$

54.14

$

52.71

$

67.32

$

70.00

24.34%

32.79%

Roanoke

$

56.86

$

50.57

$

48.75

$

54.14

-14.26%

7.06%

Savannah

$

81.57

$

74.57

$ 111.00

39.89%

48.85%

Lynchburg

$

38.00

$

37.00

$

63.93

$

50.14

68.23%

35.52%

Virginia Beach

$

59.71

$

39.14

$

97.68

$

58.86

63.58%

50.36%

$ 114.11

Source: Airdna reports
Note: Smith Travel Research reports that RevPAR in conventional hotels and motels in Virginia was $75.48 in October 2016 and that it grew 6.6 percent between October 2015 and October 2016.
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TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF AIRBNB EARNINGS BY RENTAL TYPE: SELECTED CITIES, 2016
Shared Revenue

Private Revenue

Studio Revenue

1-Bedroom
Revenue

2-Bedrooms
Revenue

3-Bedrooms
Revenue

4-Bedrooms
Revenue

Arlington

3.06%

8.79%

9.78%

15.60%

19.90%

17.08%

25.80%

Charleston

1.09%

7.50%

10.93%

15.48%

16.37%

18.40%

30.22%

Jacksonville

2.41%

9.84%

12.11%

14.77%

17.23%

17.90%

25.73%

Lynchburg

0.00%

10.76%

12.57%

15.98%

20.45%

11.93%

28.30%

Nashville

2.60%

6.74%

11.90%

13.16%

14.17%

20.78%

30.66%

New Orleans

3.05%

6.31%

10.29%

11.18%

14.82%

18.14%

36.22%

Norfolk

0.56%

11.28%

11.62%

16.17%

20.96%

18.78%

20.62%

Portland

3.78%

7.23%

12.28%

12.65%

16.04%

21.03%

26.98%

Richmond

2.85%

6.95%

9.05%

14.49%

14.77%

19.49%

32.39%

Roanoke

0.00%

10.35%

15.09%

14.71%

17.80%

19.74%

22.30%

Savannah

1.76%

9.37%

11.42%

11.96%

15.72%

15.67%

34.11%

Virginia Beach

1.04%

9.66%

2.26%

12.12%

17.65%

20.67%

36.59%

Source: Airdna reports

The moral to the story revealed by the data in Table 7 is once again

is not an easy task for cities to collect the taxes due from Airbnb hosts.

that cities that decide to devote considerable resources to forcing

Any tax based upon revenues or sales will be challenged by problems

compliance from hosts renting shared or private rooms are likely to

connected to tracking and identifying both Airbnb hosts and their

find that the costs of doing so will exceed the incremental revenues

activities. This dictum applies both to the city’s lodging and occupancy

they receive from this enforcement. Simply put, this is not where the

taxes and to the Commonwealth’s sales tax.

revenue is. The hundreds of small Airbnb hosts who come and go from the
market are difficult to track and would present significant challenges to
enforcement personnel. Further, we predict that specialized, possibly
hard-to-track Airbnb imitators will rise in importance as they address
the specific circumstances of populations, ranging from gay people
and Catholics to women and military veterans. The point is that the
more of these hosting organizations there are, the more difficult it will

Identification and collection problems may diminish, however, if it is
income rather than sales that becomes subject to taxation. Airbnb and
related hosts may believe they can thumb their noses at cities, but they are
less likely to hold that attitude with respect to the federal government’s
Internal Revenue Service, which possesses a variety of digitized tools
to identify scofflaws and can levy some impressive penalties to inspire

be for cities to enforce any ordinances that putatively apply to such

cooperation.

operations.

Perish the thought: city income taxes, perhaps piggybacked on the state

There is another fundamental conclusion to be drawn from our analysis.
Given the sometimes, almost casual nature of the Airbnb phenomenon, it

or federal income taxes, may turn out to be the wave of the future in
the gig economy – if cities are serious about collecting taxes due from
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Airbnb hosts and the multitude of other gig economy entrepreneurs
who increasingly are inhabiting the cities’ economic environment. We
make this observation not because we are advocates of income taxes
per se, but rather as dispassionate observers of economic trends.
Sales-related taxes may become increasingly difficult to collect.

IS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE GROWTH

Policy Alternatives
It is not blindingly obvious where the public interest resides in the debates
concerning the activities of Airbnb and similar firms in Virginia because
there are competing points of view, each supported by some favorable
evidence.

OF AIRBNB AND HOTEL BEHAVIOR?

A rough definition of the public interest is that it coincides with activities

Costs and prices make a difference, or so at least academic economists tell

follows that it is not the job of government to protect existing firms

their students. While a more rigorous analysis would be required to
render a definitive judgment, prima facie it appears that the pricing
behavior of Virginia hotels is partially responsible for the rapid
growth of Airbnb in their respective cities. Alert consumers look for
opportunities to substitute less-expensive goods for those that are more

that do the most good for the most people. If we adopt this view, then it
and industries from new, more efficient or more attractive competitors
that would serve consumers better and do so at lower prices. If it
were, then horse-and-buggy manufacturers and producers of 8-track
and cassette tapes still would be dominant because both would have been
protected from new competition.

expensive, and rental rooms are no exception. Rising hotel room prices
stimulate cost-conscious tourists and business travelers to contemplate

Enabling citizen consumers to spend their dollars where they wish

alternatives, including Airbnb, which may result in hotels losing market

is a welfare-maximizing stance for government to adopt, provided

share to competitors such as Airbnb.

this consumption does not generate undesirable side effects such as

Unless dramatic action is taken by cities, it is safe to say that
Airbnb and similar rental contractors are not going to disappear.
Nevertheless, traditional hotels in the Commonwealth have three
major avenues open to enable them to become more competitive
with respect to Airbnb and similar firms. First, they can be more
modest in terms of future price increases and perhaps even adjust
their current prices by means of special sales or offerings. Second,
they can make their properties and offerings more enticing, such

pollution, noise, traffic congestion, crime, unsanitary conditions that
impact public health and the like. As a rule, challenging competing firms
to meet “the market test” – that is, offer goods and services at prices and
levels of quality that are attractive to consumers and do not generate the
side effects just noted – not only is an equitable approach that treats all
citizens and firms the same, but also generates the best overall results
for the citizenry. “Best overall” here means presenting consumers with a
larger selection of goods and services at lower prices.

that accommodations are more personal, engaging and memorable

An important question relating to Airbnb in Virginia is whether all

(qualities many Airbnb customers say attract them to Airbnb

parties are being treated the same – literally, whether all participants

accommodations). Third, cities can make their hotels more attractive

(Airbnb and traditional hotels alike) have had to meet the same

by addressing issues such as traffic control, parking availability and

market test under the same rules. We believe the answer is no and that

cost, and perceived safety. If such developments do not occur, then

some Airbnb hosts have consciously evaded (and been able to avoid)

simple, but straightforward economic analysis suggests that Airbnb’s

city regulations and taxes.

growth will continue apace.

This said, it does not follow that it would be wise for cities to
devote substantial resources to ensuring that every Airbnb-type
host complies with all of the city’s ordinances. Let’s use Virginia
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Beach as an example. Airbnb hosts who rent single or shared single

Airbnb is a profitable enterprise that already in August 2016 was valued at

rooms in private homes accounted for a very small percentage of the

$30 billion when it raised $850 million in a private offering.10 To place this

total number of rooms available in Virginia Beach during 2016 and

in perspective, this is about 25 percent higher than the value of the entire

generated only about one-fifth of that city’s potential tax revenues

Hilton Hotel chain.

from Airbnb-like activities. Further, these hosts do not often appear to
be the sources of behavioral problems (noise, trash, crime, etc.).

The notion that the meteoric growth of Airbnb and similar hosts can
be choked off by punitive law enforcement is naive. Nor would this

Cities would be wise to devote their scarce enforcement resources to

be a good idea. Airbnb and similar rental hosting firms appear to be

identifying and obtaining compliance from Airbnb hosts offering their

meeting the market test, and traditional hotels need to ensure that

entire place for rent. Plainly speaking, this is where the revenue is and

they do so as well.

evidence suggests that any behavioral problems that Airbnb generates
are concentrated among these properties as well. This is not the same
as saying that the city should ignore ordinances that apply to the Airbnb
small fry. Instead, it is a rational economic calculation that expending
resources on such does not make much sense, just as members of the
city’s police force do not issue citations to every motorist who is traveling
32 MPH in a 30 MPH zone.
Larger Virginia cities might usefully imitate San Francisco in terms
of its relationship with Airbnb. San Francisco negotiated an agreement
with Airbnb that, among other things, uses the Airbnb administrative
structure to collect taxes due from Airbnb hosts. If Virginia cities can
replicate this, then the revenues they receive from small Airbnb-like hosts
plausibly could exceed the costs required to collect them. However, this
will not be easily accomplished because it imposes costs on Airbnb and
plausibly reduces both its own profits and those of its hosts. Airbnb is

Implications Of The
Gig Economy For Virginia
Cities And Counties
It would be shortsighted for anyone to view the Airbnb phenomenon as
an isolated development. Instead, Airbnb is one part of a much larger
socioeconomic trend that some have chosen to term the “gig economy.” In
the gig world, employees are not permanent; rather, they are temporary
contractors who accomplish a task and then move on to something else (or
nothing at all) with another employer, or even the same employer, but for
a different, delimited task.

unlikely to comply immediately or happily. We recognize this, but note that

More gig activity has occurred in 2017 than in years previous, and more

the somewhat similar circumstances surrounding Amazon eventually have

occupations and tasks are being filled or satisfied by gig workers than

resulted in Amazon collecting and remitting sales taxes to jurisdictions,

ever before. Intuit, the software company that produces products such as

even where Amazon has no physical presence. We believe the same

Quicken and TurboTax, predicts that 40 percent of all workers will be gig

evolutionary process will occur in markets where firms such as Airbnb

employees by 2020.11 Graph 15 illustrates the dramatic growth in contract

operate.

and temporary employees in the U.S. economy.

Finally, to return to a theme developed above, traditional hotel
operators would be well advised to re-evaluate their pricing and
quality strategies. Airbnb and similar rental hosting firms are not
going to go away. In contrast to Uber, which is losing several billion
dollars per year and has yet to demonstrate a viable business model,

10 Matt Rosoff, “Airbnb Is Now Worth $30 Billion,” Business Insider (Aug. 6, 2016), www.businessinsider.com.
11 Intuit 2020 Report. Ten Trends That Will Shape the Next Decade. https://http-download.intuit.com/http.
intuit/CMO/intuit/futureofsmallbusiness/intuit_2020_report.pdf.
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GRAPH 15
THE INCREASING NUMBER OF PART-TIME
AND15
GIG EMPLOYEES IN THE UNITED STATES
GRAPH

The Increasing Number of Part-Time and Gig Employees in the United States
Estimates suggest a sharp increase in the percentage of the U.S.
workforce that isn't employed directly by the company where they work.

I Independent contractors

I On-call workers

Temporary help agency workers

I Contract-firm workers with one client

I Contract-firm workers with more than one client
16 %
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Note: A janitor who is employed by a contract firm and cleans five unrelated offices a week
is counted as working for more than one client. Data for 1995 and 2005 don't include exact
comparisons for that group.
Source: Lawrence Katz (Harvard University)
and Alan Krueger (Princeton University)

Source: The Wall Street Journal, 269 (Feb. 3, 2017), A10
Source: The Wall Street Journal, 269 (Feb. 3, 2017), A10
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15

These are among the major implications for cities in Virginia:
• Cities and counties will be dealing with many more workers
(including Airbnb hosts) who don’t fit traditional categories, are
not accustomed to applying for things such as business licenses, may
or may not be willing to pay established taxes (or even be aware
they exist), can be difficult to track down, and who actually may be
located thousands of miles away from them.
• Jurisdictions seeking to economize and do the best for their citizen
taxpayers likely will choose to hire more temporary workers. Must
they place limits on their employment of contractual workers even if this
turns out to cost more money?

• If we put aside seasonable agricultural work, then the gig economy
currently is proportionately overrepresented with Caucasians, many
of whom are well educated and even wealthy. To the extent that the
city employs gig economy workers, it may find that these workers are
not representative either of Virginia demographics or the population
of the Commonwealth. Jurisdictions must be proactive if they wish a
different outcome. Further, reputable recent evidence suggests that
many Airbnb hosts engage in racial discrimination based upon the
names of prospective renters.12 Virginia should be alert to the possibility
that conventional means of enforcing nondiscrimination ordinances
in housing and accommodations, as well as policies monitoring its
short-term rental market and overall revenue sources, may have been
rendered less effective by gig economy developments.

• Jurisdictions must decide what levels of fringe benefits (if any)
they will provide contractual employees, particularly when their
employment period is lengthy, or when the individual is employed
repetitively. I.e., how long or often must someone be employed in
order for the city’s obligations to such employees change?
• Jurisdictions will find that the gig economy workers who actually
reside in Virginia (though perhaps only for a period of time) will
place larger demands upon their schools and social services,
and perhaps on other agencies such as law enforcement and the
judicial system. For better or worse, permanence of residence and
permanence of employment are significant predictors of positive
social behavior.
• Schools will find that increasing proportions of their students
will come and go because their parents or guardians literally are
footloose, or their financial circumstances have changed.
• Jurisdictions may conclude that many conventional measures of
achievement, such as college degrees, do not fit the gig world as well
as certificates and certifications. Thus, being certified as a project
manager, court reporter, EMT, internet network specialist, massage
therapist or licensed nurse often is more important than having earned a
baccalaureate degree.
12 Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca and Dan Svirsky, “Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence
from a Field Experiment,” American Journal of Applied Economics, 9 (April 2017), 1-22.

109

AFFORDABILITY AND
ACCESS IN VIRGINIA
PUBLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION
Mind numbing.
– Chris Jones, Chairman of the Virginia House
of Delegates Appropriations Committee,
after learning of the College of William &
Mary’s substantial increase in tuition and
fees, May 16, 2016
The precise causes of this increase are not yet
well understood.
– The President’s Council of Economic
Advisors, referring to spikes in tuition and
fees, July 2016
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W

ere one to ask a random sample
of the 388,000 students currently
attending one of Virginia’s many

fine public colleges and universities questions
about the cost of their education, one likely
would be regaled with tales of woe. Such
students no doubt will complain that the price
of attendance has gone up too rapidly and that
as a result, many of them have been forced
to go deep into debt. They will tell you that
the cost of attending Virginia’s colleges and
universities has leaped far ahead of the growth
in their family incomes, or in the consumer
price index (CPI).1
These are not unsubstantiated claims. Between
2001-02 and 2016-17, total increases in the
published “sticker prices” of tuition and fees
at Virginia’s four-year institutions ranged
from a low of 149.8 percent at Old Dominion
University to a high of 344.2 percent at the
College of William & Mary. Increases in the
Virginia Community College System ranged
from Richard Bland College’s 246 percent to
Northern Virginia Community College’s 349
percent. Graphs 1 and 2 report these data
plus information for selected Virginia public
institutions of higher education. These data
come from the Chronicle of Higher Education,

1 P
 artners 4 Affordable Excellence @ EDU, a 501-c-3 nonprofit
foundation, commissioned a public opinion poll in late 2016 that was
mounted by two highly reputable polling organizations of differing
political leanings. Among the results: 85 percent of respondents
believe that Virginia public higher education is not affordable; 90
percent do not believe their incomes are keeping up with the rising
price of higher education; 77 percent believe that policymakers
should find ways to lower the cost of attending a public college.
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which maintains a large easily accessible tuition and fee database on the
nation’s colleges and universities.

Sticker prices are the charges approved by boards of visitors and
published in catalogs. They differ from the actual prices that students
end up paying because of financial grants students may receive. These
actual prices are labeled net prices. This situation is analogous to the
difference between the sticker price of a new automobile and the actual
sales prices that a purchaser negotiates.
As we shall see, there are real-world consequences associated with these
cost increases. They include the inability of many Virginians to afford to
attend a public college, or to have to do so on a part-time basis; increasing
levels of student and family debt; increasing social and economic
stratification of student bodies; and a drag on Virginia’s economic
growth because indebted current or former students don’t buy homes or
automobiles and don’t start new businesses. These are among the reasons
why Virginia’s economy has grown more slowly than that of the United
States for six consecutive years.2 It also helps explain why enrollment
in Virginia’s public institutions of higher education has crept downward
every year since 2011 (see Graph 3). Simply put, increasing numbers of
potential students have decided that our public colleges have become too
expensive compared to the benefits they generate in return.

2 See chapter 1 of this report.
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GRAPH 1
PERCENT CHANGE IN IN-STATE TUITION AND FEES,
GRAPH 1
VIRGINIA FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 2001-02 TO 2016-17
Percent Change in In-State Tuition and Fees, Virginia Four-Year Public Institutions, 2001-02 to 2016-17
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Source: Chronicle of Higher Education, www.che.edu. HEPI is the higher education price index published by the Commonfund and is designed to reflect higher education’s distinctive costs.
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GRAPH 2
GRAPH 2
TOTAL PERCENT INCREASE IN IN-STATE TUITION AND FEES,
Total Percent IncreaseSELECTED
in In-State VIRGINIA
Tuition andTWO-YEAR
Fees, Selected
Virginia
Two-Year Public
Institutions,
2001-02 to 2016-17
PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS,
2001-02
TO 2016-17
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GRAPH 3

GRAPH 3

DECLINING FALL SEMESTER HEADCOUNTS AT VIRGINIA’S PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Declining Fall Semester Headcounts at Virginia’s Public Institutions of Higher Education
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Comparing Tuition And Fee
Increases To Changes In
Prices And Incomes

or university? Graph 6 provides this information, which is eye-opening. In

Published tuition and fee charges at Virginia’s public institutions have

234.2.

far outpaced both the CPI-U (the consumer price index for all urban
consumers)3 and changes in the median household incomes of Virginians.
Further, tuition and fee increases have dwarfed those that have occurred
in other segments of the U.S. economy. Graph 4 reports changes in a
variety of prices and incomes between 2006-07 and 2016-17. Note that
the average total tuition and fee increase at a Virginia four-year public
college or university during this period was 74 percent, compared to a 40.7
percent increase in the costs of medical care services (doctors, insurance
payments, pharmaceuticals, etc.).
Meanwhile, the CPI-U increased only 18.7 percent during these years –
only about one-quarter as much as the increase in published tuition and
fees. Graph 5 shows the relationship between the average tuition and fee
increase at four-year public institutions in Virginia and the CPI-U. Tuition
and fee increases have exceeded the growth of the CPI-U 15 years in a row.
During the same time span, median household income rose by a total of
22.4 percent, but in real, price-adjusted terms actually declined by 8.6
percent. The upshot is that tuition and fees have been spiraling upward
at the very time when the ability of the typical Virginia household to
pay such prices has been in decline. The average published tuition
and fee charge at a Virginia four-year public institution increased 3.3
times as fast as Virginia median household income between 2001 and
2016.
An interesting and relevant way to assess the ability of Virginians to
pay for Virginia public higher education is to ask the following question:
How many hours of work would it take for a Virginia worker earning the
Commonwealth’s median (50th percentile) wage rate to pay the average
tuition and fee charge at a Virginia four-year or two-year public college
3 The CPI-U covers approximately 80 percent of all Americans.

116 ■

AFFORDABILITY AND ACCESS IN VIRGINIA PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

2001, 227.7 hours of work were required for a Virginian earning the
median hourly wage to pay for tuition and fees at the typical four-year
public Virginia institution. (And this was before taxes.) By 2016, the
number of hours of work required had grown to 438. For the Virginia
Community College System, the comparable numbers were 140.2 and

Even though need-based financial aid has increased (which we
document later), it is difficult to avoid concluding that the typical
Virginian gradually is being priced out of access to public higher
education. The financial barriers to public higher education that
confront prospective Virginia students and their families progressively
have grown larger.

GRAPH 4

GRAPH 4

COMPARING TUITION AND FEE INCREASES AT VIRGINIA’S PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR INSTITUTIONS
TO CHANGES IN OTHER PRICES, 2006-07 TO 2016-17

Comparing Tuition and Fee Increases at Virginia’s Public Four-Year Institutions
to Changes in Other Prices, 2006-07 to 2016-17
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Sources: Chronicle of Higher Education for Virginia tuition and fees; College Board for average tuition and fees nationally; Bureau of Labor Statistics for the CPI-U; Commonfund for the HEPI
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GRAPH 5
GRAPH
5
Tuition
and Fee Increases
Comparing Average Four-Year Public
at Virginia Public Institutions to the Consumer Price Index: FY 2001 to FY 2016

COMPARING AVERAGE FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC TUITION AND FEE INCREASES
AT VIRGINIA PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS TO THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, FY 2001 TO FY 2016
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GRAPH 6
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Net Prices Are
Most Important

Graph 7 presents the average net price paid by undergraduate students at

The tuition and fee numbers presented thus far have been “sticker

in the Commonwealth is the University of Virginia’s College at Wise,

prices” – the charges approved by each institution’s board of visitors and

followed by Norfolk State University and Radford University; the highest-

subsequently published in their catalogs. At some colleges and universities,

cost institution is Christopher Newport University, followed by Virginia

only small proportions of the student bodies actually pay these sticker

Commonwealth University and the University of Mary Washington.

prices and the massive remainder pays lower prices because they receive

Despite having the highest sticker price of any public institution in the

financial grants. These grants can be need-based or merit-based, the

country, William & Mary, on average, charges a net price that places it

latter perhaps reflecting superior grades and standardized test scores, or a

well below the group average of $16,312.

particular talent such as athletic prowess, acting ability or musical talent.

Virginia’s four-year public colleges and universities in 2014-15, the latest
year for which comparable data are available. The data in Graph 7 shine
a somewhat different light on tuition and fees. The lowest-cost institution

The net price data provided in Graph 7 make it clear that every institution

The most common grant received by financially needy students is a

is providing significant need-based grants to its students. Has this aid been

federal Pell Grant, which currently cannot exceed $5,815 annually.

sufficient to compensate students and their families for the tuition and fee

Instead of, or in addition to Pell Grants, institutions may provide

increases that have been imposed? The simple answer is no and this is not

students with other financial grants that do not need to be paid back.
Institutional endowments commonly are thought to be the major source
of such funds, but reality is that internally redistributed tuition and fee
monies provide the most dollars for such grants. There are two primary
sources of redistributed funds. First, out-of-state students are charged
premium prices and the dollars they contribute subsequently are allocated
by institutions for a variety of purposes, including financial grants to
students. Second, students hailing from families with higher incomes
effectively are charged higher prices and often their tuition dollars are
reallocated via grants to other students who come to campus from lowerincome families.
In effect, the pricing policies of most colleges and universities today
(including both public and independent institutions in Virginia, twoyear and four-year alike) administer a collegiate version of a steeply
progressive income tax, taking from the more wealthy and giving to the
less wealthy by means of the net prices each group pays.4 Again, “net
price” here refers to the effective price each student ends up paying after
financial grants (but not loans that have to be repaid) are deducted from
the published sticker price.

a disputed judgment, either in Virginia or nationally. The Appropriations
Committee of the Virginia House of Delegates found that the statefunded financial aid grant per student increased by 75 percent at the
Commonwealth’s four-year public institutions between 2003 and 2015,
but tuition and fees increased an average of 170 percent.
Nationally, the College Board, a nonprofit organization representing more
than 6,000 colleges and universities, reported that even after accounting
for all financial grants received by students at public colleges and
universities, the real, price-adjusted costs paid by these students rose by
a total of 65.4 percent between 2000-01 and 2016-17. This translates to a
compound growth rate of 3.2 percent annually – after inflation.
Nevertheless, there is considerable variation among institutions where
net prices are concerned. Institutions with larger endowments typically
provide larger financial grants to students that need not be repaid,
though the impact of these grants is reduced because their tuition and fee
charges are higher as well. Also, as noted above, some institutions are very
aggressive price discriminators – they charge different students different
net prices, usually based upon their residence (in-state versus out-ofstate) and their family incomes (upper-income students pay much higher
net prices than lower-income students).

4 Critics argue that these pseudo-taxes have not been approved by the Virginia General Assembly.
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GRAPH 7
GRAPH 7
AVERAGE NET PRICE OF ATTENDANCE AT VIRGINIA’S
Average Net Price of Attendance at Virginia’s
FOUR-YEAR
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS,
2014-15
Public Institutions,
2014-15
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The Economic And
Social Stratification
Of Student Bodies

39 percent). This reflects two major factors: (1) Virginia incomes are

An institution cannot charge premium prices to out-of-state students or to

families.

wealthier in-state students unless it enjoys brand magnetism that enables
it to do so. As time passes, the pricing and financial aid policies of each
institution mold the composition of its student body.

higher than the national average5 and hence fewer Virginians qualify for
Pell Grants; and (2) tuition and fees at Virginia institutions are higher
than the national average. The $5,810 annual cap on Pell Grants means
that the student bodies composed of those students who can afford to
attend are weighted a bit more heavily toward upper-income students and

The College of William & Mary’s 11 percent Pell Grant percentage for
its undergraduate student body was the lowest of any public college or
university in the United States and the University of Virginia’s 12 percent

In January 2017, The New York Times published revealing data for more

was not far behind. Prima facie, neither institution is very accessible to

than 2,000 institutions that disclosed the percentage of each institution’s

student applicants from lower-income families. Additions to this list might

student body that came from the upper 1 percent and the lower 60 percent

include James Madison, Christopher Newport, Virginia Tech and Mary

of the income distribution of the United States. Table 1 reports these data

Washington. One could question whether this is consistent with their

for a selection of colleges and universities in Virginia. The stratification

status as public institutions serving the entire citizenry.

of Virginia institutions on the basis of family incomes (and presumably
wealth as well) is immediately apparent. Almost one in every five
undergraduate students at Washington and Lee University came from a
family in the upper 1 percent of the national income distribution, whereas
at Old Dominion University and Patrick Henry Community College (to
name only two), less than 1 percent of the undergraduate student body
emanated from such families.
Only one in 12 undergraduate students at W&L came from the bottom
60 percent of the income distribution, but approximately two-thirds
did so at Norfolk State. If the denizens of the bottom 60 percent of the
income distribution can be fashioned as “common people,” then one might
say that at least five Virginia public institutions (University of Virginia,
William & Mary, Virginia Tech, University of Mary Washington and
Christopher Newport University) have relatively few common people in
their undergraduate student bodies.

In defense of several of these institutions (and especially W&M), they
do provide generous need-based financial grants to students who come
to them from lower-income families. Table 3 provides the average net
price paid by students who came to these institutions from households
with incomes that were $30,000 or below. These students nearly always
qualified for a Pell Grant, but typically required substantial additional
financial aid to be able to attend.
William & Mary’s generously low $4,459 net price for students from
households with incomes of $30,000 or less stands out. Clearly, W&M
has made the provision of grant-based financial aid to its lowest-income
students a very high priority. We know of only one other institution, the
University of Michigan, which offers its lowest-income students a lower
net price ($2,660). The University of Virginia also deserves kudos for
lowering the net price paid by its lowest-income students by more than
$600 between 2014-15 and 2015-16.

One measure of the accessibility of a college or university to students
coming from lower-income families is the percentage of Pell Grant
students that institution enrolls. It is evident in Table 2 that Virginia
institutions in general enroll smaller percentages of undergraduates who
receive Pell Grants (26 percent) than the national average (approximately
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5 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reports that the 2015 national median household income was $56,516,
while the comparable Virginia number was $61,086.

TABLE 1

TABLE 2

FAMILY INCOMES OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS AT SELECTED
VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS

PERCENTAGE OF ALL UNDERGRADUATES RECEIVING PELL GRANTS
AT SELECTED VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS, 2015-16

Percent Students
From Families
Upper 1%

Percent Students
From Families
Bottom 40%

Washington and Lee

19.1%

8.4%

U Richmond

15.1%

20.6%

U Virginia

8.5%

15.0%

William & Mary

6.5%

12.1%

Hampden Sydney C

6.1%

22.3%

U Mary Washington

2.9%

17.6%

Virginia Tech

2.8%

15.0%

James Madison U

2.6%

12.6%

Christopher Newport U

1.7%

18.1%

George Mason U

1.5%

26.2%

Radford U

<1%

26.4%

Va Commonwealth U

< 1%

31.0%

Old Dominion U

< 1%

33.2%

Northern Va CC

<1%

42.3%

Liberty U

<1%

43.4%

Blue Ridge CC

<1%

50.9%

Thomas Nelson CC

< 1%

52.4%

Norfolk State U

< 1%

66.0%

Patrick Henry CC

<1%

75.8%

Source: “The Upshot,” The New York Times (Jan. 18, 2017)

Washington and Lee U

9%

C of William & Mary

11%

U of Virginia

12%

James Madison U

14%

Virginia Tech

16%

Christopher Newport U

16%

U of Mary Washington

17%

U of Richmond

18%

Roanoke C

23%

Randolph-Macon C

23%

Longwood U

24%

Virginia Average

26%

George Mason U

27%

Virginia Commonwealth U

28%

Dabney Lancaster CC

29%

Radford U

31%

Old Dominion U

37%

National Average

39%

U Virginia Wise

38%

J. Sargeant Reynolds CC

39%

Thomas Nelson CC

42%

Eastern Shore CC

43%

Mountain Empire CC

46%

Liberty U

47%

Norfolk State U

62%

Virginia State U

71%

Source: National Center for Education Statistics’ College Navigator
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these institutions might endanger their coveted rankings if they ended

TABLE 3

up reducing SAT and ACT scores and other metrics, such as graduation

NET PRICES PAID BY STUDENTS COMING TO SELECTED CAMPUSES
FROM FAMILIES WITH INCOMES $30,000 OR BELOW IN 2015-16

There are undeniable financial considerations attached to institutional

William & Mary

$4,459

admission strategies. Pell Grant students can be expensive to educate

U of Virginia Wise

$9,396

because they require more institutionally based financial aid and

U of Virginia

$9,463

augmented campus services. Enrolling additional Pell Grant students

Old Dominion U

$11,470

might reduce the number of slots available for full price out-of-state

Radford U

$12,720

Norfolk State U

$13,952

Rare is the president of a top-ranked institution who wants to preside

Virginia State U

$12,998

over a noticeable decline in his or her institution’s rankings. What

U of Mary Washington

$11,899

member of an institution’s board of visitors will brag about the lower

James Madison U

$12,872

Virginia Tech

$11,998

Longwood U

$15,786

Are there other reputable national models available for consideration?

George Mason U

$15,089

Yes. At the University of California at Berkeley, for example, 30

Virginia Commonwealth U

$13,593

percent of undergraduates were Pell Grant recipients in 2015-16,

Christopher Newport U

$15,500

Source: National Center for Education Statistics’ College Navigator

students who pay more than $40,000 in annual tuition at W&M and UVA.

national ranking that came about because more Pell Grant students were
admitted?

while at UCLA it was 35 percent. Indeed, five University of California
campuses are ranked among U.S. News & World Report’s Top 25 public
institutions and each enrolls more Pell Grant students than all but a few

The problem is that very few lower-income students end up being

of Virginia’s four-year public institutions. Further, these institutions offer

able to take advantage of William & Mary’s generosity. This is true

rather low net prices to their lowest-income students – 8,677 at Berkeley

for a variety of reasons, including of course W&M’s impressively

and $7,900 at UCLA in 2015-16.7

high admission standards. Much the same story might be recited at the
University of Virginia, though it is not as liberal in providing grant-based
financial aid to its lowest-income students.

Georgetown University’s Center on Education and the Workforce
recently examined Pell Grant enrollments in highly selective colleges
and universities and concluded “selective colleges can afford to admit

These episodes inspire intriguing public policy questions. Should Virginia

more Pell Grant recipients.” Anthony Carnevale and Martin Van Der

subsidize colleges and universities whose pricing of undergraduate

Werf of Georgetown recently proposed a “20% Solution” such that the

education to Virginians often imitates private institutions? Is it

undergraduate student bodies of selective institutions should include at

appropriate for the citizenry to subsidize institutions that increase social

least 20 percent Pell Grant recipients. The duo argue that the institutions

and economic inequality rather than provide the traditional ladders of

can afford to do so and that this “could equalize opportunity in higher

opportunity that diminish differences? These are knotty questions because,

education.”8

inter alia, the Top 25 rankings of W&M and UVA depend in part on their
ability to structure their operations and prices in the fashion just outlined.
Programs designed to increase the presence of lower-income students at
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6 With respect to graduation rates, see Sarah Butrymowicz, “Billions in Pell Dollars Go to Students Who Never
Graduate,” Hechinger Report (Aug. 17, 2015).
7 College Navigator.
8 https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/The-20-Percent-Solution-web.pdf.

Ultimately – though institutions often argue otherwise – they are not

TABLE 4

prisoners of history and circumstance. As time passes, colleges and
universities retain the ability to reshape their financial models and
student profiles. Several Virginia institutions have done so in recent
decades (notably James Madison and Christopher Newport), though they
have moved away from, not toward, the Pell 20 model. Nevertheless, the

THE GROWTH OF KNOWN STUDENT DEBT INCURRED OF
BACCALAUREATE DEGREE GRADUATES OF VIRGINIA FOUR-YEAR
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
Year

Percent of Known
Debtors

Average Level of Debt

2011-2012

61%

$26,407

2012-2013

62%

$27,582

A bipartisan proposal in Congress would assign financial penalties to

2013-2014

63%

$28,322

institutions that take the lowest proportions of Pell Grant students. At

2014-2015

63%

$29,267

2015-2016

62%

$29,822

example of the University of California campuses suggests that institutions
may be able to retain both rankings and reputation even while they
become more accessible to students from lower-income backgrounds.

9

least half a dozen Virginia public four-year institutions appear to have
made strategic decisions that effectively restrict the access of lowerincome Virginians to those campuses. Is this a trend that the citizenry

Source: State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, “Who Borrows and How Much Do They Borrow?”
http://research.schev.edu/apps/info/Articles.Student-Debt-A-First-Look-at-Graduate-Debt.ashx

should support? We do not have the answer to this question, but it

TABLE 5

is easy to observe that what is perceived to be good for an individual
institution’s national rankings may not be synonymous with what is good
for Virginians.

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COLLEGE STUDENT DEBT
Those who have significant student debt are:

Student Debt
When students and their families cannot afford a Virginia public college
or university, one of three things happens. They may choose not to attend

• Less likely to buy a home (New York Fed, 2013)
• Less likely to start a new business (Philadelphia Fed, 2015)
• More likely to live with their parents (Fed’s Board of Governors, 2015)

college at all; they may switch from full-time to part-time attendance; or

• Less likely to save for their retirements (Brookings, 2014)

they may go into debt by borrowing money to pay their educational costs.

• More likely to have negative household wealth (Armantier, 2016)

The State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (SCHEV) collects
data concerning student debt in the Commonwealth. SCHEV found that

• More likely to have an inferior credit rating score (New York Fed, 2013)
Sources: Noted above

62 percent of 2015-16 baccalaureate degree graduates borrowed an
average of $29,822 to pay for their education. The 62 percent debtor

Student debt changes lives and alters behavior. Table 5 summarizes a

number for 2015-16 graduates was up from 56 percent for 2006-007

variety of unhappy aftereffects attached to student debt. It will suffice

graduates. SCHEV labels these debts “known” and cautions that its report

for us to observe that rising levels of student debt do not constitute a

may not capture all debt these graduates incurred.

recipe for bringing Virginia out of its economic growth doldrums.

9 J
 on Marcus, “Top Universities Could Take Thousands More Low-Income Students, Study Says,” Hechinger
Report (May 2, 2017), http://hechingerreport.org/top-universities-take-thousands-low-income-studentsstudy-says.

Student debt owed to the U.S. government (more than 80 percent of all
student debt) is nondischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.
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This means that federal student debt follows former students for the

What are those other reasons? They include:

remainder of their lives and cannot be avoided unless they qualify for a

• Institutional concern with national rankings is epitomized by U.S. News

limited number of federal debt forgiveness programs. In 2016, no payments
were being made on almost half of all federal student debt accounts and
11 percent were in serious default (Forbes, April 10, 2016).

& World Report rankings. Fixation on rankings can lead to a variety of
decisions considerably divorced from the needs of taxpayers, students
and families.

The bottom line is that it is in the best interests of Virginia to graduate

• Inter-institutional amenities competition stimulates institutions to offer

students who are debt free, or whose debt obligations are small. Rapidly

such things as recreational spas and climbing walls as well as upscale

rising higher education prices (both “sticker” and “net”) push the

(and expensive) food services.

Commonwealth in the opposite direction.

• Institutions often construct new, spacious buildings even though
it is costly to maintain this space and their use of existing space

Why Have Tuition And Fees
Increased So Rapidly?

is surprisingly low. A 2014 study by the State Council of Higher
Education for Virginia disclosed that no residential four-year campus
in the Commonwealth utilized its classrooms more than 76 percent
of reasonably available hours, and three campuses ranged below 60
percent usage. Parenthetically, it is not clear that adding significant

Virginia’s higher education institutions argue that their tuition and fee

new space is an intelligent public policy when internet-based instruction

increases have been necessary because of reductions in state general fund

is expanding and headcount enrollments are declining. Modernization

tax support. This assertion is true – but only to a certain point. Between

and rehabilitation of existing space may make more sense and be less

1996 and 2015, Virginia cut its real, enrollment-adjusted appropriations

expensive.

to its institutions of higher education by about 26 percent.10 Hence, it is
understandable that the colleges and universities moved to replace this
revenue with tuition and fee dollars.

• Institutions increasingly assess mandatory fees to support items ranging
from student centers to athletic teams. In 2016-17, eight Virginia fouryear public institutions charged their full-time undergraduate students

However, a fall 2016 analysis by the staff of the House of Delegates’

athletic fees of $1,538 or more. Consider Christopher Newport’s $1,886

Appropriations Committee concluded that institutions raised tuition $2

annual fee. This corresponds to a charge of $188.60 per three-hour

for every $1 they lost in state appropriations between 1996 and 2015

undergraduate course. Doubtless CNU’s Captains are well regarded, but

(see Graph 8).

11

Thus, Virginia’s public colleges and universities have

been increasing tuition for other reasons as well. This conclusion is
consistent with recent national studies.

12

they also are expensive and students bear a substantial portion of that
cost.
• The growth of institutional room and board charges at most Virginia
institutions easily has exceeded the growth of the consumer price index
(see Graph 9). First-rate residence halls and excellent food are pleasing,
but costly.
• Administrative proliferation (as measured by the number of

10 “ Higher Education Affordability,” House Appropriations Committee Retreat, Nov. 15-16, 2016, http://hac.
virginia.gov/committee/files/2016/11-15-16/III%20-%20Higher%20Education%20Affordability.pdf.
11 “Higher Education Affordability,” House Appropriations Committee Retreat, Nov. 15-16, 2016, http://hac.
virginia.gov/committee/files/2016/11-15-16/III%20-%20Higher%20Education%20Affordability.pdf.
12 One example is Neal McCluskey, “Not Just Treading Water,” Policy Analysis (Cato Institute, Feb. 15, 2017).
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administrators per faculty member or student) exists on most campuses.
Further, these administrators tend to be paid well.

Graph 8

GRAPH 8
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• Institutions have reduced the proportion of their budgets they spend on
instruction (see Graph 10).
• Disproportionate growth in spending on employee fringe benefits (which
sometimes have substituted for pay raises during difficult years) has
pushed tuition and fees upward.
• Federal government financial aid policies are based upon institutional
costs. Hence, when institutional costs increase, the “feds” supply more
money.
• Institutions are reluctant to take advantage of new teaching and
learning technologies, flipped classrooms and other innovations that have
the potential to scale higher education.
• Institutions are disinclined to share resources with other institutions,
even in low-enrollment areas such as foreign languages and literatures.
• Institutions are averse to pricing the resources they use internally, such
as space, and this leads to suboptimal behavior and hoarding.
• Institutional mission creep has propelled many institutions into offering
new, low-enrollment programs, often at the graduate level.
• Faculty productivity, as measured by faculty credit hours generated, has
declined on most campuses.
• Subsidies from undergraduate students often are required to support
faculty research activity and this is true even in cases where the
research also is supported by outside grants.
This is an extensive list and one should understand that the application
of these factors often varies substantially from one campus to another.
Nowhere is this truer than in Virginia, where institutional independence is
relatively high compared to many other states, not the least because each
institution has its own board of visitors. Collectively, these are among the
primary reasons why tuition and fee increases at Virginia’s public colleges
and universities not only have vastly exceeded the growth in the consumer
price index and median household income, but also why they have been
substantially higher than the national average.
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Graph 9
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GRAPH 10
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9

Would Legislative Rules
Constraining Tuition And
Fee Increases Make
A Difference?

sum. In effect, by assessing tuition and fee increases in excess of the

If tuition and fee increases have been too large, then would rules imposed

limited to the previous year’s growth in the CPI.

either by the Virginia General Assembly or the State Council of Higher
Education for Virginia constrain increases and improve the situation?
Perhaps.

growth in the CPI, UVA reallocated an estimated $106.11 million from
Virginia students and their families to whatever alternative purposes the
university valued more highly.14
Cumulatively, over the 15-year period 2001-02 through 2016-17, the tuition
and fees UVA charged its in-state undergraduates totaled $721.38 million
more than what those charges would have been had their increases been

Many readers are aware even while these tuition increases were being
imposed, UVA was accumulating a $2 billion-plus discretionary fund.
The university did so legally. Choice-making, however, is an intrinsic,

Let’s utilize an example to clarify the situation. Graph 11 compares the

unavoidable part of the exercise of leadership. This particular set of

University of Virginia’s annual tuition and fee increases to three-year

choices invites questions. Might not UVA have used some of the

rolling averages of changes in the consumer price index (CPI) and median

$2 billion-plus it accumulated to lower the tuition and fees assessed

Virginia household income. After recording zero or even negative tuition

Virginia students at the university? Could not more modest tuition and fee

and fee increases in the first years of this century, in 14 of 15 subsequent

increases have been imposed on in-state undergraduates that would have

years, UVA’s tuition and fee increases exceeded the three-year rolling

reduced the $721.38 million estimate previously noted? Ultimately, such

average rates of growth in both the CPI and Virginia median household

decisions reflect the values held by the senior officers of institutions and

income.

their board members.

If UVA had been restricted to tuition and fee increases that were equal

The point here is not that UVA misused the $721.38 million (or the

to the rolling three-year average growth of the CPI, then this would have

$2 billion-plus fund), but instead that as economists point out, there were

cut approximately 61 percent from UVA’s per student in-state tuition and

real opportunity costs – foregone alternatives – attached to this approach

fee charge in 2016-17. Specifically, UVA’s published tuition and fee price in

to managing the institution. Alternatively, perhaps more spartan ways

2016-17 was $15,714. If instead, between 2001-02 and 2016-17, UVA had

to operate the institution existed instead of UVA choosing to impose the

increased its tuition and fees only at the rolling three-year average rate of

equivalent of a 61 percent excise tax on Virginia students and families.

growth in the CPI, then in 2016-17 its tuition and fee charge would have
13

been only $6,047 – 38.5 percent of the actual cost.

Would a low-tuition policy have done damage to UVA’s rankings and its
ability to accomplish its stated institutional goals? Quite possibly, given

One can approximate the total cost of this higher tuition strategy to

the fashion in which rankings usually are assigned. This is an important

Virginia undergraduates. SCHEV reports that UVA enrolled 16,631

reason why our discussion here will not lead to a definitive conclusion. The

undergraduate students in fall 2016, of which approximately 66 percent,

goal of this chapter has been to highlight affordability and access issues

or 10,976, were Virginians. If these 10,976 Virginians had paid $6,047 in

and the costs associated with current tuition and fee regimens, not to

tuition and fees rather than the actual $15,714 in 2016-17, then collectively
in that year alone they would have saved $106.11 million – a rather tidy
13 July to July of each year.

14 We assume that 66 percent of the undergraduate students in each year would qualify for in-state tuition
and fees. Note that one use of the $106.11 million by UVA was to provide additional financial aid to its
undergraduates. Hence, some students received back some of the proceeds of the putative excise tax that
all paid.
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prescribe an operating plan for any Virginia public institution, including
UVA.
Lest anyone view tuition and fee rules such as the one we have
just illustrated for the CPI as a panacea, we point out that skillful
administrators likely could find a variety of ways around any restrictive
rule legislators might devise. For example, they might choose instead to
impose discipline-specific surcharges (for example, charging engineering
students higher tuition) to sidestep an overall tuition cap. Or, they
might impose user fees on many campus services previously free or lowpriced. They might also raise room and board charges and then assess a
larger administrative fee to their residence hall operations (or any other
auxiliary enterprise) for central services provided.
One could go on, but the implications are clear: Regulatory authorities
nearly always must struggle to impose their wills on those they regulate.
Human imagination seemingly is infinite and those who are regulated are
adept at finding new ways to circumvent what initially might appear to be
ironclad behavioral rules. The law of unintended consequences still holds
sway.
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GRAPH 11

GRAPH 11
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Is “Free” Tuition A Solution?
Considerable attention nationally has been focused on proposals for
“free” tuition. Tennessee led the way in this regard for adult community
college students and political candidates in both parties have picked up
free tuition as a popular campaign plank. The notion has simple appeal
– simply abolish tuition at public institutions, or at least at community
colleges.

Governors, Boards Of
Visitors And The General
Assembly Are Crucial
University administrators cannot increase published tuition and fee
charges on their own. Their recommendations in this arena must be
approved by their boards of visitors, whose members are appointed by the

Alas, this is a notion that does not survive careful analysis. First, at most

governor. One can cut to the chase by observing that many, perhaps most,

community colleges, large numbers of students pay little or no tuition

members of the boards of Virginia colleges and universities come to believe

already because of the need-based financial aid they receive. Hence,

that their primary responsibility is to their institution (and by extension,

free tuition ends up supporting large numbers of students who have no

perhaps its president) rather than to taxpayers, citizens and students.

demonstrated financial need. This represents a questionable redistribution
of income and use of public funds.

Gradually, significant numbers of board members end up being co-opted
by their university’s president and senior administrators, who treat them

Second, place yourself in the role of a college president who has just

well, shower them with attention and present them with almost uniformly

been informed that henceforth the state will cover tuition costs for her

positive news about their institution. If basic institutional “dashboard”

students. What incentive does she now have to control costs? Little or

variables (enrollment, fundraising, rankings) appear to be in order,

none. Free tuition fails to address an obvious problem in public higher

then most board members tend to defer to their president and senior

education – rampant cost inflation. On the contrary, it accentuates the

administrators when they receive proposals from them (including tuition

difficulty.

and fee increases). Discussions concerning accessibility and affordability

Third, if institutions no longer collect tuition from many students,
then they will become heavily dependent upon state appropriations.
Unfortunately, state general fund support is highly variable and on a per-

periodically arise at some meetings, but they are matters that nearly
always receive less attention than items relating to new buildings and
academic programs.

student basis has declined substantially over past decades. Institutions

Lunches and dinners during board meetings are filled with the likes

would find themselves dealing with highly cyclical finances.

of Fulbright Scholar faculty members, those who have garnered large

Free tuition is a Band-Aid solution to the much more deep-seated problem
of public college price inflation. It does not respond to the forces that have
generated our current challenges.

research grants, string quartets and jazz groups, students who have been
admitted to prestigious graduate schools, and members of the campus
community who are local incarnations of Mother Teresa. When combined
with tickets to an enticing football or basketball game, these amenities
form a seductive mixture that subtly discourages probing questions that
might disrupt the flow. Indeed, board members who delve too deeply, or
who venture into the uncomfortable territory of affordability and access,
may find themselves being counseled by senior board members and advised
to stick to the agenda and avoid being contentious.
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Given this environment, what if future Virginia governors were to choose
to appoint to boards of visitors only those individuals who view citizens,
taxpayers and students as their primary constituency and concern? What
if future Virginia public college and university presidents were evaluated
on the basis of the access and affordability of their institutions in addition
to the usual dashboard metrics? What if future administrative salary
increments were to reflect this reorientation?
The answers are that we would soon observe different behavior by
administrators and see more modest tuition and fee increases. The current
system is fixable, but only if governors, legislators and board members
understand what has been going on and how the game is played on
campus. It will take definitive action by future governors, legislators and
board members for the Commonwealth to pull itself out of the current rut.
The General Assembly has a significant role to play in terms of the
incentives it implants in the budgets it passes. Why should institutions
that have been circumspect in their tuition and fee increases receive
the same budgetary treatment as those that have implemented large
increases?15 Legislators can and should ask significant questions of
prospective board of visitors nominees concerning their approach to their
duties. Future board members, as a condition of their service, should be
required to undertake significant orientation activities that address many
of the issues covered in this chapter as a condition of their appointments.
The accumulated evidence suggests that it is time to move in different
directions in public higher education in Virginia. If we opt to do so, then
the rewards will be higher economic growth rates and, some might argue,
a more equitable society that emphasizes the opening of opportunities
rather than the closing of doors.

15 Old Dominion University provides an instructive example. As Graph 1 reveals, ODU’s tuition and fee
increases have been the lowest in Virginia among four-year institutions and Business Insider named the
institution the “most affordable” four-year public institution in Virginia. It enrolls large percentages of
financially needy students who aspire to social and economic mobility. Its reward has been visibly lower
per student general fund financial support (compared to other doctoral institutions). Restraint has been
penalized.
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he notion that unified regional
governments in Virginia’s metropolitan
areas might improve our lot has been

around for a long time. After all, it is not
heretical to assume that economic and political
benefits could accrue if we pursued regional
governance and consolidated the provision of
many public services.
The economic arguments in favor of
regionalization focus on a factual reality and
a supposition. First, the weight of economic
empirical evidence tells us that public services,
ranging from water supply to libraries, exhibit
significant economies of scale.1 Large size
lowers unit costs and, on occasion, can increase
the quality of output as well. Of course, there
are always exceptions to the rule and not all
public services enjoy economies of scale.
Second, the supposition is that businesses
prefer to locate in regions that “have their
act together” (the observation of a Virginia
corporate executive). Firms and organizations
understandably prefer the certainty of dealing
with a minimum number of governmental
entities. While businesses may not always be
thrilled with what these governmental entities
do, they know what buttons to push. It is
certainly not a stretch to argue that businesses
can save money if they don’t have to interact
with a large number of governmental entities.
In the political realm, deservedly or not, cities
and counties in several areas of Virginia have
acquired reputations for pushing multiple,
1 A
 lesch, Daniel J., and L.A. Dougharty. The Feasibility of Economiesof-Scale Analysis of Public Services. Rand, 1971.
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competing legislative agendas. The absence of clear regional priorities and
direction affects the ability of other state and national representatives
to bring home the proverbial legislative bacon. It seems plausible that
more might be accomplished if the cities and counties were all rowing in
the same direction. Unified regional governmental units arguably might
help in not only coordinating legislative action, but also in attracting new
businesses and dealing with challenges such as climate change.
The most obvious example of large-scale regional government is New York
City, with its more than 8.5 million residents spread across five boroughs.
Since 1898, the boroughs have been united in one city government. The
consolidation of the boroughs not only created a unifying government,
but also allowed each borough to retain some aspects of local authority.
The borough-city relationship in New York mirrors the state-national
federalism of the United States. Virtually all agree, however, that the
borough of Manhattan is primarily a location, and New York City is both a
location and the ultimately responsible governmental unit.
It is not a stretch to assert that many of the things we prominently
associate with New York City today – the United Nations, numerous
Fortune 500 company headquarters and superb cultural attractions, such

Virginia Antecedents
Interest in regional government and the consolidation of public services
has waxed and waned over the years in Virginia. Appendix A lists some of
the successful and unsuccessful annexation attempts by Virginia cities in
the last century. Richmond’s acquisition of Manchester in 1910, Newport
News’ addition of Warwick in 1958 and Christiansburg’s addition of
Cambria in 1964 are among the successful acquisitions. The list of failures
is long, however, and includes rejected annexation attempts by Winchester
in 1969, Charlottesville in 1970 and Roanoke in 1990.
In 1980, the Commonwealth reacted to pressures from those opposed to
annexations and approved regulations that permitted counties with larger
populations and greater population density to immunize themselves from
annexation proposals. Chesterfield, Henrico, Henry, Prince William,
Roanoke and York counties immediately benefitted from this legislation.
Virginia also granted partial protection to counties that already provided
public services similar to those of adjoining cities anxious to annex
them. In 1987, the General Assembly imposed a “temporary” ban on
annexations of county lands by cities that remains in effect to this day.

the Metropolitan Museum of Art – would exist in the metropolitan area
only in diminished form, or not at all, if five or more separate cities existed
rather than one unified city. Witness the city of Richmond and Henrico
and Chesterfield counties, or the seven major cities of Hampton Roads,

Since 1980, Virginia law has authorized local circuit courts to grant
counties immunity from any annexation by a city if they satisfied certain

as they wrestle over matters small and large, including entertainment

population and population density requirements: a population of 50,000

venues, outlet malls, economic development agencies, vehicle tolls and the

and a density of 140 residents per square mile; or, a population of 20,000

like.

and a density of 300 residents per square mile. Practically speaking,

At the same time, however, it also is true that New York City

these standards virtually eliminate annexations in urban areas.

simultaneously has developed a reputation for supporting a large,
expensive and bureaucratic government. Further, some major
infrastructure and institutions do not seem to work well (consider
LaGuardia Airport and the subway system). The Big Apple also generates
very large levels of economic inequality.2 It appears that ledgers with
respect to regional unification nearly always contain both pluses and

Each of the preceding developments is consistent with Virginia’s status
as a Dillon Rule state. The foundation of the Dillon Rule is a distrust of
the motivations and competence of local governments. Virginia’s Supreme
Court adopted the Dillon Rule in 1896 via City of Winchester v. Redmond,

minuses.

and has concluded that local governments in Virginia only have powers

2 http://www.epi.org/publication/income-inequality-in-the-us.

powers must be explicitly defined and related to the core functions of
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that are conferred upon them by the General Assembly, and that these

local governments.3 Figure 1 brings these restrictions to life in the realm
of annexations by means of the example of the city of Norfolk. Between
1845 and 1959, Norfolk’s physical size expanded as the result of five major
annexations, including the areas encompassing the largest naval base in

FIGURE 1
ANNEXATION BY NORFOLK,
FIGURE 1 1845-1959:
AN EXAMPLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Annexation by Norfolk, 1845-1959:
An Example of Local Government Changes in Hampton Roads

the world and the region’s major airport. Annexations halted, however, in
1959 with the creation of the cities of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake and

~---

subsequent changes in state laws in the 1970s and 1980s. Norfolk today is

'

an enclosed city for which no opportunities for further annexation exist.
The same circumstance effectively applies to other Virginia cities such as
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. - ,, ~

JI

" _:

JI.

~ ~

Alexandria, Fairfax, Lynchburg, Richmond and Roanoke.

Source: City of Norfolk, Map Gallery

Source: City of Norfolk, Map Gallery

3 L
 amb, James C., and Martin P. Burks. “Virginia Reports. Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia.” The Virginia Law Register 93 (1897): 711-18. doi:10.2307/1097665.
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GO Virginia And
Regionalization
Imitating Old Faithful, approximately once per decade in Virginia, interest
in regional solutions to governance and service provision rekindles and
groups are formed to encourage regional solutions to problems and issues.
The current GO Virginia initiative – with its statewide brief – follows in
this tradition (http://www.govirginia.org). In 2016, the General Assembly
allocated $27 million to GO Virginia to encourage regional collaboration,
with a primary focus on making the Commonwealth’s regions more
attractive to current and prospective businesses.
The emergence of GO Virginia must be considered in the context of the
Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee’s widely cited November
2016 report, which eviscerated the performance of the Virginia Economic

path to travel. The proponents of GO Virginia include nearly every
organization of significance in the Commonwealth.
There are other views, however. Less charitable pundits view GO Virginia
as a new publicly financed Christmas tree around which ambitious cities,
businesses and universities will gather to pluck gifts. Thus, many of
Virginia’s largest businesses will partner with universities, new firms
and governmental units to grab a share of the goodies. Universities will
perceive these funds as a viable way to offset the general fund cuts and
as a funding source for construction of new research and development
facilities. Surely, none of these developments is necessarily a bad thing, but
such processes may not result in the highest and best use of the funds.5

GO Virginia is governed by a 24-member statewide board that oversees
nine regional boards, each of which may submit programmatic and

Development Partnership.4 This highly critical review of the Partnership’s

funding proposals to the statewide board. The regions vary substantially

operations generated a set of changes: a new Partnership director, a

in terms of population – about 400,000 to 2.5 million – and do not

reorganization and a reduced budget. It also stoked political support for

reflect the geography of already established planning districts. GO

alternatives, such as GO Virginia.

Virginia is not a part of the executive branch, but instead reports to the

GO Virginia is a more focused approach to economic development that

General Assembly. Nor does the State Council for Higher Education in

simultaneously spurs regional cooperation. Axiomatically, legislators

Virginia appear to have any specific authority relating to the activities of

usually like programs that promise the return of state dollars to their
districts, and GO Virginia promises to do just that. Politically, GO Virginia
also provided both the executive and legislative branches with a valuable
opportunity to stand clear of the documented failures of the Virginia

public colleges and universities funded by GO Virginia. Yet to be clearly
established is who will evaluate GO Virginia performance, or how and
when this will occur.

Economic Development Partnership.
Public-spirited efforts with a regional accent, such as GO Virginia,
usually attract the support of major corporations, corporate leaders
and cognoscenti because they appeal to virtues that many citizens hold
dear, such as cooperation, elimination of duplication and the promotion
of economic growth. It is not surprising that the consensus view in the
Commonwealth is that GO Virginia represents a new, more productive

4 J
 oint Legislative and Review Committee, Management and Accountability of the Virginia Economic
Development Partnership (November 2016), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/vedp-2016.asp.
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5 See the website Bearing Drift, “Stealth Regionalism Quietly Makes Headway on the Coattails of GO Virginia,”
Part One (May 10, 2017) and Part Two (May 23, 2017), https://bearingdrift.com.

Megaregions?
This United States has been rapidly urbanizing in recent decades. In 2015,
the Census Bureau reported that 62.7 percent of all Americans reside
in only 3.5 percent of the nation’s land area.6 Most of these inhabitants
live in “megaregions,” consisting of overlapping metropolitan areas that
once were separate and distinct. Witness the expansion of the BaltimoreWashington, D.C., agglomeration, which now stretches south to within 50
miles of Richmond and north to the Delaware border.
Thinking in terms of megaregions, some contend, is entirely rational
because these entities are meaningful, interdependent economic units
that overlay city, county and state boundaries. Individuals commute to
Washington, D.C., from all directions, including West Virginia, Maryland
and Virginia. In Chicago, the market for commuters and customers
stretches from Wisconsin through Illinois to Indiana. The salient point is
that “old” geographic and political boundaries do not constrain economic
activity or social intercourse, and megaregions roughly define the most
critical economic and social interconnections.
Megaregions are defined by the behavior of workers and customers
rather than conventional geographic boundaries.

occur in megaregions. A September 2005 Global Gateway Report, “The
United States of America’s 3rd Century Strategy: Preserving the American
Dream” (Regional Plan Association, 2005), proposed:
“As the number of economically competitive regions grows around
the world, America’s cities need to band together in order to
strengthen their role in the global economy. … As metropolitan
regions in the United States grow together, many diseconomies
have emerged, such as congestion in transportation networks which
affect the economic vitality and quality of life of these regions. The
megaregion model is based upon the idea that if the cities in these
colliding regions work together they can create a new urban form
that will increase economic opportunity and global competitiveness
for each individual city and for the nation.”
America 20507 has identified 10 megaregions expected to emerge over the
next several decades. They are depicted in Figure 2 and include a huge
northeastern megaregion that extends from Boston to Northern Virginia.
Note that the Richmond-Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News axis is
not included on this list and Richmond’s leadership appears to be more
interested in pursuing connections with Northern Virginia than with
Hampton Roads.

As Parag Khanna, a global strategist and author, argued in The New York
Times (“A New Map for America,” April 15, 2016):
“Increasingly … socially and economically, America is reorganizing
itself around regional infrastructure lines and metropolitan
clusters that ignore state and even national borders. … To an
extent, America is already headed toward a metropolis-first
arrangement. The states aren’t about to go away, but economically
and socially, the country is drifting toward looser metropolitan
and regional formations, anchored by the great cities and urban
archipelagos that already lead global economic circuits.”
Proponents of megaregions estimate that between now and 2050, more
than two-thirds of the U.S. population growth and economic growth will
6 www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-33.html.

7 A
 merica 2050 is the Regional Plan Association’s national infrastructure planning and policy program,
providing leadership on a broad range of transportation, sustainability and economic-development issues
impacting America’s growth in the 21st century.
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FIGURE 2
AMERICA 2050’S EMERGING MEGAREGIONS
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Richmond And Hampton
Roads: Are There Arguments
For A Megaregion?
Practically speaking, regional and megaregional cooperation will occur
only if citizens and leaders opt for collaboration rather than competition.
This is much easier said than done. Candidates running for office in
Fairfax County receive zero votes from residents of Loudoun County and
so their political future is not tied to regionalism. The legendary Tip
O’Neill, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1977-1987, was
substantially on target when he commented that, ultimately, “all politics is
local.”
Nevertheless, many modern governmental problems and their solutions
overlap political boundaries and metropolitan regions. Transportation
issues frequently exemplify this situation. If widening I-81 is a good idea
(and few who travel it consistently would say otherwise), then multiple
regions and states must be involved in planning such a development and
pushing it to conclusion because the highway travels through dozens of
counties and cities and several states. Political boundaries begin to blur in
such situations.
Finding common ground is the key to any uncoerced agreement. The
most attractive common ground for voters and elected officials is
identifiable financial gains. This can come in the form of reduced costs
or improved service. Prospective multiregion gains are possible (though
hardly guaranteed) if cities, counties and regions cooperate not only on
transportation projects, but also in areas such as sanitation and health,
the environment, job training, cultural amenities, higher education and
the ability to attract businesses large and small. A side benefit is that

law firm, was involved in discussions in the early 2000s with business
leaders of Hampton Roads and Richmond concerning the possibility of
merging the two metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) to create one
megaregion from Hampton Roads to Richmond. Frantz wrote in the
Richmond Times-Dispatch in June 2012:
“As the competition to attract economic development becomes
greater and more global, many localities are finding short-term
financial incentives are not enough. A solid infrastructure, plentiful
amenities and the ability for people and businesses to connect with
one another and to the outside world must also be present. Cities
that want to compete nationally and internationally are blurring
boundaries, combining their assets and resources, and redefining
themselves through alliances with other nearby cities to become
more attractive.”
In an article in Virginia Business magazine, Frantz explained further what
he was proposing:
“We’re not talking about merging cities, counties, fire departments.
We’re not talking about combining governments or even merging
economic development authorities. All we’re talking about is to
enhance the way we hold ourselves out to the world as a combined
mid-Atlantic gateway.”
A Richmond-based regional think tank, Richmond Future, led by former
Virginia Commonwealth University president Eugene P. Trani, has
researched the central Virginia region and assessed the future of the
capital city and the surrounding area. While the group has not formally
adopted a resolution supporting the megaregion approach, it did say the
following in a report printed in the Richmond Times-Dispatch on Feb. 21,
2016:

joint approaches often also generate the raw political clout that translates

“The interests that our region shared with Hampton Roads around

larger size and population into more favorable governmental treatment at

the Port of Richmond and Route 460 became far clearer to see,

the state and federal levels.

with some even envisioning the potential formation of a ‘mega-

The notion that a megaregion approach to many issues would be
advantageous is not a new one. Thomas R. Frantz, of the Williams Mullen

region’ in which the economic and transportation planning would
enhance our common interests in a globally integrated economy.”
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The contributors to “Megaregions: Planning for Global Competitiveness”

TABLE 1

(Catherine Ross, ed., Island Press, 2009) concluded:
“Megaregions offer flexible frameworks to harmonize

COMPARING THE RICHMOND AND HAMPTON ROADS MSAS (2016)
Characteristic

Richmond MSA

Hampton Roads MSA

Square Miles of Land
Area

4,576.3

2,682.9

Counties

13

5

Cities

4

9

Population

1,281,708

1,726,907

Education, High School
Grad

90.0%

91.1%

Education, Bachelor’s
or Higher

36.7%

31.4%

that they cannot be overcome? (2) If the benefits do exist, will the body

Civilian Labor Force

669,033

831,056

politic, especially the Dillon Rule-protective General Assembly, permit

Per Capita Personal
Income*

$50,460

46,400

Personal Income*

$64,151,580,000

$80,033,527,000

Median Family Income*

$75,126

$70,597

Gross Domestic
Product

$80,702,000,000

$92,827,000,000

transportation with quality of life, economic opportunity, and
environmental sustainability. Megaregions are the infrastructure
and economic footprint in the global economy. Megaregions
provide a sustainable future through multi-scalar, cross-boundary
solutions. Megaregions allow us to think globally, coordinate
regionally and act locally.”
This is grand rhetoric. Not yet demonstrated, however, are answers to two
critical questions: (1) Can economic and political benefits really be realized
by acting together, or are the differences between areas such as Hampton
Roads and Richmond, or Richmond and Northern Virginia, so large

cooperative megaregion behavior to develop and flourish?

Are We On Our Way To A
Richmond-Hampton Roads
Megaregion?
Table 1 reveals that while the Richmond-area MSA is physically larger
(4,576.3 square miles) than the Hampton Roads MSA (2,682.9 square

*Most recent data from 2015 (U.S. Census)
Sources: Virginia Economic Development Partnership, Virginia Employment Commission, U.S. Census Bureau
and Bureau of Economic Analysis

accouterments if, of course, the citizens of the new megaregion could agree
upon its location.

miles), the population of the Hampton Roads region is larger (1,726,907

Does the theoretical concept of a Richmond-Hampton Roads megaregion

to 1,281,708). The greater density of the population in Hampton Roads is

represent reality insofar as work patterns and connections are concerned?

reflected in the transportation issues discussed subsequently. Likewise,

Not quite yet, as Figure 3 reveals. However, we can see in Table 4 that

the nominal gross domestic product of Hampton Roads exceeds that of

a substantial number of workers do make the trek between the two

Richmond ($92.8 billion compared to $80.7 billion).

metropolitan areas. Of the top 10 out-of-metro cities and counties to

What would be the economic size of a combined Richmond-Hampton
Roads megaregion? Table 2 tells us that it would rank as the 20th-largest
metropolitan economy in the country. Clearly, a metropolitan region of this
size would be sufficient to attract a major airport and other transportation
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which residents of Richmond commuted in 2014, five were in Hampton
Roads: Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Newport News, James City County and
Chesapeake, in that order of magnitude. This involved 20,834 workers.
Additionally, of the top 10 out-of-metro locations from which Richmond
workers commuted, five were in Hampton Roads: the cities of Virginia

Beach, Newport News, Norfolk, Chesapeake and Hampton, in that order.

To place these numbers in context, consider that in 2016, on average the

This flow involved 22,595 workers. The total “in and out” flow of workers

size of the civilian labor force in the Richmond metropolitan area was

in the Richmond metro constituted 6.49 percent of the labor force and the

669,033. Hence, 43,429/669,033 = 6.49 percent of that labor force was

total flow in both directions was 43,429.

traveling to or from Hampton Roads for work. Insofar as Hampton Roads
was concerned, 42,923/831,056 = 6.57 percent of that labor force was

Of the top 10 out-of-metro cities and counties to which residents of

traveling to or from Richmond for work.

Hampton Roads commuted in 2014, four were in the Richmond area:
Henrico, Chesterfield and Hanover counties, and the city of Richmond.

If we consider Richmond and Hampton Roads as a unit, then in

This flow involved 27,007 individuals. Of the top 10 out-of-metro sites

2014, more than 86,000 workers commuted back and forth between

from which workers in Hampton Roads commuted, three were in the

Richmond and Hampton Roads. This does not a megaregion make,

Richmond area: Richmond and the counties of Chesterfield and Henrico.

but does reveal that economic connections between the two regions are

This flow involved 15,916 individuals and the total flow in both directions

greater than some might suspect.

was 42,923.

TABLE 2
REAL GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT (GRP) BY METROPOLITAN AREA, 2010 AND 2016 (CHAINED 2009 DOLLARS)
GRP 2010

GRP 2016

Nat’l Metro Size Rank

GRP Growth Rate
(2010-2016)

Baltimore MSA

150,990

164,545

19

8.98%

Charlotte MSA

115,827

140,815

21

21.57%

Cincinnati MSA

105,826

116,071

28

9.68%

Cleveland MSA

104,299

114,492

29

9.77%

Columbus MSA

94,257

114,492

30

21.47%

Denver MSA

151,224

180,446

18

19.32%

Phoenix MSA

178,640

203,253

16

13.78%

Portland MSA

141,374

151,817

20

12.42%

St. Louis MSA

134,051

140,712

22

4.97%

Hampton Roads MSA

81,132

81,363

39

0.28%

Richmond MSA

61,992

69,987

44

12.90%

RICH/HR Combined MSA

143,124

151,350

21

5.75%

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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FIGURE 3
FIGURE 3
COMMUTING PATTERNS IN VIRGINIA’S URBAN CRESCENT
Commuting Patterns in Virginia’s Urban Crescent

Source: “An Economic Geography of the United States: From Commutes to Megaregions,” by Garrett Dash Nelson and Alasdair Rae (Nov. 30, 2016),
Source: “ An Economic Geography of the United States: From Commutes to Megaregions,” by Garrett Dash Nelson and Alasdair Rae (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://figshare.com/articles/United_States_Commutes_and_Megaregions_data_for_GIS/4110156
https://figshare.com/articles/United_States_Commutes_and_Megaregions_data_for_GIS/4110156
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Nothing prevents the Richmond and Hampton Roads metropolitan

Taking the long view, however, there is little mystery concerning where

areas from marketing themselves as a megaregion and then behaving

the process of urbanization is leading us. If this chapter is rewritten 25

accordingly – for example, developing a super-regional airport midway

years from today, then we could expect it to report evidence showing

between the two population centers, promoting and accelerating the

the Richmond and Hampton Roads metropolitan areas touching each

widening of I-64, supporting the development of the Port of Virginia

other along the I-64 corridor and the Washington, D.C., and Richmond

(though centered in Hampton Roads, it has one location in Richmond),

metropolitan areas approaching, if not touching, each other. Given

developing a cooperative approach to high-speed rail and cooperating on

this likelihood, it would be silly not to give thought to what such a

regional-friendly legislation such as GO Virginia.

megaregion should look like in terms of its governance.

The federal government’s Office of Planning and Budget is responsible for
designating megaregions; however, being designated as a megaregion (or
claiming to be one) yields no automatic benefits. Federal programs focus
on metropolitan regions such as the Richmond metropolitan region rather
than megaregions. Ultimately, some minor prestige may attach to the label
“megaregion,” but no stream of federal funding is tied to that designation.
Consequently, a megaregion is as a megaregion does. Cooperative,
forward-looking behavior that recognizes interdependence and the need
for jointly derived solutions is the operational key.
What would a megaregion beginning in Baltimore and bending south to
Hampton Roads look like? Table 4 reports population and gross regional
product data for the four major components of such a region. In terms of
GRP, this megaregion would be the third largest in the country, trailing
only Los Angeles and New York (see Graph 1). Once again, however, one
must recognize that this designation would be meaningless unless it were
accompanied by coordinated, collaborative behavior in critical areas,
such as transportation. Given that such cooperation has proven to be
difficult inside Virginia (for example, between Richmond and Hampton
Roads), it is fair to predict that it would be at least as challenging to
achieve consensus and cooperation across several states and the District of
Columbia.

147

2017 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT

TABLE 3
OUT-OF-METRO COMMUTING PATTERNS: RICHMOND AND HAMPTON ROADS, 2014
Top 10 Out-of-Metro Places To Which Workers Commute Out-of-Region
Richmond Metro

Hampton Roads Metro
Number of Workers

Number of Workers

Fairfax County

15,463

Fairfax County

12,647

Virginia Beach

5,942

Henrico County

11,128

Prince William County

4,222

Richmond

7,514

Newport News

4,085

Chesterfield County

5,879

Norfolk

4,022

Arlington County

3,814

Spotsylvania County

3,697

Prince William County

3,263

Chesapeake

3,618

Loudoun County

2,753

Loudoun County

3,265

Hanover County

2,486

James City County

3,167

Alexandria

1,896

Arlington County

2,832

Stafford County

1,430

Top 10 Out-of-Metro Places From Which Workers Come
Richmond Metro

Hampton Roads Metro

Fairfax County

8,592

Chesterfield County

6,668

Virginia Beach

7,504

Fairfax County

5,842

Prince William County

5,873

Henrico County

5,581

Loudoun County

4,639

Prince William County

4,348

Newport News

4,212

Currituck County, NC

3,910

Norfolk

4,059

Richmond

3,667

Chesapeake

3,780

Loudoun County

2,720

Spotsylvania County

3,356

Middlesex County

2,689

Hampton

3,040

Pasquotank County, NC

2,505

Albemarle County

2,357

Accomack County

2,450

Source: Virginia Employment Commission Origin-Destination Statistics, 2014

148 ■ TIME TO GO REGIONAL OR MEGA?

TABLE 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF A MID-ATLANTIC MEGAREGION: BALTIMORE TO HAMPTON ROADS, 2016
Gross Regional Product (GRP)

Population (Estimate)

Baltimore

$187,395,000,000

2,798,886

Hampton Roads

$92,827,000,000

1,726,907

Richmond

$80,702,000,000

1,281,708

Washington, D.C.

$509,224,000,000

6,131,977

Totals

$870,148,000,000

11,939,478

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau for population and Bureau of Economic Analysis for GRP
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GRAPH 1
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCTS OF THE LARGEST METROPOLITAN REGIONS
GRAPH 1
IN THE UNITED STATES AND A VIRGINIA URBAN CRESCENT MEGAREGION, 2015
Gross Regional Products of the Largest Metropolitan Regions
in the United States and a Virginia Urban Crescent Megaregion, 2015
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Can We Learn From Others?
Aside from New York City, three outstanding examples of regional
government in the United States are Portland, Minneapolis-St. Paul and

range of cities and towns than otherwise probably would have been the
case.

MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. PAUL

Indianapolis. We will discuss each briefly to give readers what could well

The twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul are distinct governmental

be a taste of the future.

units in Minnesota. Minneapolis (population 407,000) is the county seat

PORTLAND
Portland is the country’s only MSA to have gone as far as establishing
a general-purpose, regionally elected governing body. “Metro,” as this
elected government is known, serves more than 1.5 million people in
a metropolitan area with a population of almost 2.4 million. Metro
encompasses the city of Portland and 23 other cities. The cities and
counties maintain their own local governments, but Metro provides
regionwide planning and coordination to manage growth, infrastructure
and development issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries. It does
the transportation planning; manages 17,000 acres of parks, trails and
natural areas; and operates attractions such as the Oregon Zoo, Oregon
Convention Center, Portland Expo Center and Portland Center for
the Arts. It plans and oversees the region’s solid waste and recycling
programs.
Portland is a medium-sized city – the nation’s 25th-largest metro area in
terms of population. Oft-referenced publications such as “Places Rated”8
consistently assign it high rankings, citing its regional transit system,
the walkability of its urban areas and its environmental consciousness, in
addition to conventional amenities and many attractive job opportunities.
Portland provides evidence that regions can flourish with a regional
government as an overlay to local governments.
Even so, it should be noted that financial savings associated with
Portland’s particular model of regional government have never really been
documented. Indeed, given the notably progressive political bent of the city
of Portland’s citizenry and leadership, regional government has turned out
to be a vehicle for extending a high-tax, high-service model to a broader

8 www.bestplaces.net.

of Hennepin County, which includes 44 other cities. St. Paul (population
297,000) is the county seat of Ramsey County. Together, the two cities
usually are referred to as the Twin Cities – hence the name of their major
league baseball team, the Minnesota Twins. The metropolitan region
includes seven counties as well, and the metropolitan area population
exceeds 3.28 million.
St. Paul maintains a unique neighborhood governance system whereby it is
divided into 17 city districts, each of which has a council funded by the city,
and exercises significant powers, especially on land-use issues. The overlay
of the regional government structure of the Twin Cities metropolitan
area is an almost 50-year-old Metropolitan Council whose members are
appointed by the governor. The council deals with the region’s public
transportation, sewage treatment, regional and urban planning, housing,
and parks and trails. The enabling state legislation provides that the
Metropolitan Council shall “provide a framework for regional systems
including aviation, transportation, parks and open spaces, water quality
and water management.”9 The Metropolitan Council boasts that it offers
a variety of public services at lower-unit costs than comparable cities, and
there is some evidence in favor of this view.

INDIANAPOLIS
Indianapolis (population 858,000, but almost 2 million in the metropolitan
area) has a complex form of governance known as “Unigov” that came
about in 1970 when the city consolidated with the government of Marion
County and 11 towns. While local governments maintain some of their
own municipal services and identities, including police and schools, Unigov
provides consolidated services not unlike Portland and the Twin Cities.

9 https://metrocouncil.org.
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The Indianapolis experience is unique in that it has been the subject of a

strictly subject to the same red tape as municipalities in Virginia, it would

comprehensive study and evaluation: “40 Years after Unigov: Indianapolis

seem that any attempt at regionalization in the Commonwealth would

and Marion County’s Experience with Consolidated Government” (Jeff

necessitate one of two things: an imaginative solution similar to Unigov,

Wachter, May 2014, Center for Government Research, www.cgr.org).

where towns can consolidate services creatively while still maintaining

Wachter concluded that “Unigov-impacted communities in Indianapolis

enough separation to circumvent the Dillon Rule, or at minimum a

are in a better position going forward – the economy is stronger, the tax

reduction in how broadly Virginia applies the Dillon Rule to certain

base is broader, and the city’s reputation is greater.” Noting that some

aspects of municipal sovereignty.

of the initial impact of Unigov may be declining, Wachter makes the
important point that “the benefit of consolidation might not have been
dependent on unified government as much as on a unified vision for the
region’s future.”

If notable Virginians such as Mr. Jefferson were in residence today,
would they insist that Virginia governmental laws, structures and
traditions, some of which date to before the American Revolution,
be maintained, regardless of their relevance to today’s challenges
or their cost effectiveness? We venture this observation: If these

Final Observations

revered individuals were as astute and perceptive as history

The experience of Indianapolis underlines an important point: Cities and

wish to maintain local contact and control wherever plausible,

counties do not need to establish formal regional governmental structures
to cooperate. More important are the attitudes of the participants and
their willingness to collaborate.
Given the rapid pace of urbanization along the mid-Atlantic coast and the
likely continued growth of the federal government, it is easy to forecast
that in 25 years, Virginia’s urban crescent will constitute a continuous
band of population and economic activity with no rural interruptions.
A salient question is how this urban swath should be governed. Some
regional and multiregional governmental solutions surely must be
considered. Portland, the Twin Cities and Indianapolis provide some
guidance in this regard.
Aside from natural tensions between localities arising from regional
consolidation and political motivations, Virginia’s almost notorious
status as a Dillon Rule state may prove to be the largest barrier to
regionalization. Insofar as municipal sovereignty is concerned, compared
to states across the country, localities within Virginia are significantly
disadvantaged due to the Commonwealth’s long history of Dillon Rule
jurisprudence and, perhaps most relevant to this discussion, the denial of
several local governmental consolidations throughout the 20th century. In
light of the fact that Indianapolis, the Twin Cities and Portland are not
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records, then transplanted to 2017, they would be supporters and
advocates of innovative regional governance structures. They would
but simultaneously encourage and implement regional solutions to
challenges that no longer respect city and county boundaries.

APPENDIX A
SUCCESSFUL CONSOLIDATIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN VIRGINIA
Units of Government Involved

Name of Consolidated Government

Merger Effective Date

Richmond (city) Manchester (city)

City of Richmond

1910

Waynesboro (town) Basic City (town)

Town of Waynesboro

1923

Hampton (city) Phoebus (town) Elizabeth City (county)

City of Hampton

1952

Newport News (city) Warwick (county)

City of Newport News

1958

Virginia Beach (city) Princess Anne (county)

City of Virginia Beach

1963

South Norfolk (city) Norfolk (county)

City of Chesapeake

1963

Tazewell (town) North Tazewell (town)

Town of Tazewell

1963

Christiansburg (town) Cambria (town)

Town of Christiansburg

1964

Holland (town) Whaleyville (town) Nansemond (county)

City of Nansemond

1972

Suffolk (city) Nansemond (city)

City of Suffolk

1974

DEFEATED CONSOLIDATIONS
Units of Government Involved

Proposed Name of Consolidated Government

Year of Rejection

Hampton (city) Newport News (city) Warwick (city)

City of Hampton Roads

1956

Richmond (city) Henrico (county)

City of Richmond

1961

Winchester (city) Frederick (county)

City of Winchester

1969

Roanoke (city) Roanoke (county)

Name of city to be determined by voters.

1969

Charlottesville (city) Albemarle (county)

Name of city to be determined by voters.

1970

Bristol (city) Washington (county)

Name of city to be determined by voters.

1971

Front Royal (town) Warren (county)

Front Royal - city or county form to be determined by voters.

1976

Pulaski (town) Dublin (town) Pulaski (county)

County of Pulaski

1983

Staunton (city) Augusta (county)

Consolidated County of Augusta and Tier City of Staunton

1984

Covington (city) Clifton Forge (city) Alleghany (county)

City of Alleghany Highlands

1987

Emporia (city) Greensville (county)

City of Emporia

1987

Roanoke (city) Roanoke (county)

Roanoke Metropolitan Government

1990

Clifton Forge (city) Alleghany (county)

City of Alleghany

1991

Bedford (city) Bedford (county)

City of Bedford and Shire of Bedford

1995

Source: Virginia Commission on Local Government
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